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A study of the military legal significance of the
extension in the breadth of the territorial seas of the
world, including an analysis of the pertinent Conventions
and international practices* The major topics covered are
the effects of such extensions on (!) passage through,
under, and over straits and territorial seas (2) the right
of innocent passage of warships, and (3) the general hind-




i. amt&rnnm - • * ~ i
A. General Introduction ------ - - I
B. Indonesian Sxftaples - - - - 6
C. xolufiien of Plcheriee Problem* - - - - - 8
ilitary Advantages of ft Sromd Territorial
Soft m - m * - - - 11
II. 1TATU5 OF THS THaB8-KILB LIMIT 13
A* JExtonoiene of Breadth - - - - — -••-13
B# Extensions of 3aeellne - * * - m -25
III. ADVIMB IFFBCT8 OF EXfUfSlOtf OF '
TWMUTOMftL SEA - - * + 3*
A. eral Introduction -----------36
3. Innocent Paesage ------------- ^3
1. fffflUHITOill flyfflMr - U
2- PTtgflifllrt W
*• Sttgfftoo Parnate - - 53
a« What ie Innocent? --------54
What is ftoftftftg*? mm - 5?
c. Are conventional warehlp*
Included?- •--•----•.-58
d. Are Atosio-Powered Carabine
Included? • «*•------ 65




f. The Right to Regulate 72
S* Passage In Wartime -•-•---- 83
C, Violations of Neutral Territory - •» 3'i
D« Mobility and Dispersal --• -)k
8. Diplomatic Deployment ---..-..-•-- 96
P. Cala Water Operations 98
IV. CONCLUSION 99
APPB5TOIX A. SSL KARHOW PASSAOS ABEAS AFFECTED
3X gXOTfSIOH OF TBB TK !BA - - 103
AF|>SNDIX ft, MP OP INDONESIA 104





an million of rsiiaiToaiAL sbas
Chapter I4 Introduction
A. General Introduction
In I960, when the nuclear-powered submarine Triton
its submerged circumnavigation of tho globe, it
pasted, submersed, through the Surigao Strait north of
Mindanao in the Philippines, across the Mindanao Sea,
through the Celebes Sea to the -aicassar 3trait between
the islands of Borneo and Celebes, and on south of Javtt
into the Indian Ocean, Had the unilateral claims of the
Philippines'* and Indonesia* to the waters within their
respective archipc ' - as internal waters, the Philippine
1, The Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified
the United Nations Secretariat on Dec, 12, 1955
>
that "all waters around, between and connecting the
different islands be to the Philippine Arch-
ipelago irrespective of their widths or dimensions,
ar; ossar; uioes of its land territory,
into ~>f the national or inland
waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the
llippinee." .Laws and Herniations on the jjfM&y of
the territorial f?c . < ; . . Poo. So, i.'.'/' / ; ;. ,/6,*— .* M>ii^ni»il»y,(.i,i« ' fin 1, * * r *
at 39 (1956),
2. On Feb. 18, i960, Indonesia published its Regulation
in Lieu of Act no. ** Clause 2 of Art, 1 claims as
inland seas all those areas of the sea within strai
elines "connecting the outermost points on the low
water mark of the outermost islands or part of such
islands comprising Indonesian territory, 1" Addendum|o <:.upp, ,tomI^ya and, fteflulatj,on8 on the He^no of the
Sea. U, ;. :qc. o. Vc ,19/5\dd.l. at
3-'* (I960).

claim of territorial waters even beyond twelve miles,
3
and Indonesia's claim to a territorial sea of twelve miles
been recc^nized by the United States^ or established i
international law, such navigation would have been im-
possible without a bilateral agreement. In making such
a Journey, x'rlton silently maneuvered through areas claimed
by the Philippines and Indonesia as their respective ter-
ritorial seas and internal waters. Under the general rule
of international law, vessels may not pass through internal
waters as a matter of right, even if their passage is
innocent.-* /en where innocent passage is allowed,
3. In a note verbal dated Jan. 20, 1956, from the per-
manent mission of the Philippines to the United
Nations, 2 Xb. Int»l L. Comra., 69-70, U.S. Doc. Uo.
A/CN.V99 (1956), the Philippine representative claimed
as territorial sea all of the area designated by the
Treaty of Paris of Dec. 10, 1393. This area forms a
box of hXrh sea around the islands, the boundary of
which extends almost to Taiwan on the north and is
as far as 300 uiiles from Philippine land in some
sections.
b. The United States recognizes neither the Indonesian
nor the Philippine olalms to a territorial sea
greater than three miles from the low water line.
Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of
the "pa: The " :'l ht for Propdog of the Heas
.
5^ km,
J. Int'l I-. 751, at 7^5 (I960).
5. 1 Oppenhelm, International Law ^6l (8th ed. Lauteroacht
1955) /hereinafter cited as OppenheiraJ?
'
either In the territorial seas by international law or in
inland waters in accordance with international law" or
the retractable benevolence of the coastal state, ? sub-
marines are required to travel on the surface of the
water and to show their fl
This is an examole of only one of the numerous adverse
effects that an internationally r >d extension of
territorial seas would *©. Arthur Dean, the chairman
of the United States delegations at both the 1958 and the
I960 Geneva conferences on the law of the sea, has stated
that,
The desire of the United States to maintain
a relatively narrow territorial sea and, more
particularly to prevent any extension to 12 niles
was based not aierely on the fact th&t the 3-mile
limit has Uttg been recognized in international
law but also on corsoellinn; ruilit&ry and commercial
considerations
.
6. Convention on the Territorial 3ea and the Contiguous
Zone, -ril 12, 1961, art, 5» P.H. ^>oc. Ho. A/CONi .
13A.52 (1958). As of Jan. 196':, ratification by
one more state was required, before the convention
would enter into force*
?. For an example see Indonesian Reflation in Lieu of
Act so. k, 9 art. 3, ?2.\' 3
8, Draft Convention, art. 12, 1 Codification Com
ence, 1930, League of Nations Pusb« no, C. 1930 v. 9;
Convention on ^rritorlal 3ea and the Contiguous
Sons, art. 14 (6), r.— / , note 6,




The United States, of course, is by no means the only-
beneficiary of a n< - territorial sea. As two author-
ities have phrased it, the retention of narrow territorial
sea limits is in the public interest of the "whole of man-
kind.'' It results in a net advantage in community
values.'-*-
It will be the ourpose of this study to investigate
some of the military consl i§ involved in an ex-
tension of the territorial sear: of the world from il
Viewpoint and, in I king* to stress the n- Ity for
considering the military Implications thereof whenever
policy regarding international agreements in thil l is
formulated.
e freedom now enjoyed by citizens of the United
States and other nations of the Free world can most easily
be lost oy indifference to the military necessities of the
nation. Specifically, what good, in the protection of
the Free world, is a strong HWf if* out of political ex-
pediency, its hands should be tied by agreements limlti^
its area of operation to such an extent that it can no
longer act effectively?
10. iioDougal & Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans
51-56 (1962) /hereinafter cited as ^cDougal/.

rhls question is not asked to belittle the be-
leaguered noil tl clan*. It la raised simply to express
the belief that it is not only orooer but imperative that
international policy makers, both military and civilian,
slder the adverse effects which the extension of ter-
ritorial fleas would have on the caoabllity of their
nation 1 I armed foroee to oerform successfully their mission
of preserving freedom as a way of life. . ean supplied
emphasis for this noint when, shortly after the 1958
Geneva Conference, he wrote thats
• navigational uurposes . • •/the extension
of the terrltor atxj would ol. s lar
.cific area iiito a series of unconnected 'lake® 7*
of high seas. Surface wars'..
LtS connecting fetal X
X _ lid not, in the
?enoe of a treaty, extend to an alrcrai '
to n cubraariae'
ernte under the surface of them. 11
11. Dean, supra note 9 > at 9*0. . ;oan, of course,
»fc limit ote of an '.- a of




In the following discussion of these problems, a
large number of examples will be taken from the conditions
as they exist in Indonesia, This has been done intention-
ally to stress the magnitude of the ooabined effects in
any one part of the world.
For the Dast several years, Indonesian policies
and pronouncements have been of prime concern to United
States diplomats working on southeast Asian problems.
Since December 13, 1957 » Indonesia has unilaterally
claimed not only a twelve-mile breadth for its territorial
sea, but that this distance is measured seaward not from
its coasts but from straight base lines connecting speci-
fied protruding points of the various islands in its
archipelago. 2 When one considers that Indonesia is the
worlds largest archipelago, *3 consisting of approximately
12. Council of Ministers of the Republic of Indonesia
proclamation of Dee, 13, 1957. For a translation
of the Indonesian text as published in the Indonesian
law journal *Hukumw , vol, 1958, 3f#« 5-6, Annex I,
see Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian States and
the Development of International Law 173-7^ (1961),
13. « X. World Telegram I Sun World Almanac for 196^,
355.
14. 15 Encyclopedia Americana 70 (1962 ed).
MM
">r.-:A *.
13»000 islands-^ spread across the waters for more than
1,100 miles from north to south and over 2,800 miles
east to west, encompassing roughly 2,500,000 square miles
of which only about 575*000 are land, the geographical
smgnitude of its claim to territorial and inland waters
becomes apoarent. Its political-military magnitude is
equally apparent from its position, both ^eo^raphio and
political, in southeast Asia. It is here that many his-
toric and important sea and air lanes run through and
over the oceans and straits which Indonesia now claims to
be Internal and territorial. Inasmuch as an extension of
the territorial seas to twelve miles would make all of the
passages through the Indonesian islands internal or
territorial waters, recogni tion of*^ and obedience to
Indonesia's claim would effectively close the major
gateways to the Indian Ocean.
15. 3 Off. Rec. U.M« Conf, on the Law of the Sea ^3,
U.N. Doc. No. A/CGMF.13/39 (1958).
16. An unilateral extension does not In itself bind other
nations. In the Anfclo-iJftrwe&lan Fisheries Case,
£ 1951_/ I.C.J. Rep. 132, the court summarized the
rule by saying t '"The delimitation of sea areas has
always an international aspect, it cannot be dependent
merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed
in its municipal law." The United States, the United
Kingdom, and at least 1^ other c-ovemments still re-
gard the Indonesian waters as high seas. Great Britain




C. Sxclusion of fisheries Problems
idonesia, however , has not furnished an example of
one of the problems that has beset oonferenoes on the ex-
tension of territorial seas* the problem of fishing
rights. That this has been a problem in discussions in
this area Indicates a confusion with regard to the con-
cept of territorial waters. This confusion may best be
classified as a failure to distinguish between a coastal
state's national boundary desi<snation on the seaward edge
of the territorial sea and the various partial Jurisdic-
tional rights which it may exercise in limited areas of
the fciffc aeas.
In conformity to the doctrine of freedom of the seas,
there has been no right to exclusive fishing areas in the
high seas.^? nis, in order to claim exclusive fishing
rights it has been necessary to claim co-extensive ter-
ritorial seas. In 195&» however, at a meeting of the
Sixth Committee of the United Mations,a new concept was
introduced when Canada proposed the creation of a con-
bi uous zone for exclusive fishing beyond the three mile
1?. Inlem, ghe International Le.c:al Statue of the
rrltorial Sea
. 5 Vltl. L. Hey. 206, at 210 ( I960
)
where it is stated that "although customary Inter-
national : iM b-r- recognised, that coastal states
may exercise sovereignty beyond their territorial
sea for the purpose of enforcing sanitary, customs,
immigration and fiscal regulations, the question of
exclusive fishing rights within the continuous rone





territorial tea and whioh would extend to a limit of
twelve miles, 1 Canada again proposed this concept at
the 1958 Geneva Conference. ^ At the i960 Conference the
United ntatee Joined Canada in proposing a six-mile ter-
ritorial sea and an additional six-mile exclusive fishlr
zone. 2^ This "six-plus-six" proposal has been adopted by
Senegal , South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay23* and
nay well be on its way to adoption by custom.
The right to exclusive fishing is one of those various
partial Jurisdictional rights which could well be exercised
by a coastal state in specified areas of the high seae by
international agreement or custom but which should be dis-
tlngv from the setting of a nation 1 s boundary in the
tea. The claiming of exclusive fishing rights does not
18. 7 . . :. \sa. Off. I*0«| 11th 3ess., 6th Comm., '*93d
meet para, 57,
19. tted as . Doc. ,. v/CONF.13/C.l/L.77/ lev.l,
on ,arch 29, I see statement of Prime minister
Pearson before the Canadian House of Commons, r
B.C. . 621 (1963), reorinted in 2 Int f l Leg,
Materials 66k (1963).
20. Submitted to l^th Plenary Meeting April 25, 1953, as
U.M. Doc. NO. A/CONF.13/L.29.
21. See letter from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Dutton to U.S. Senator Gruening reprinted in 109
Cong. Sec. 11279-80 (1963),
M
carry with It a claim to that comolote soverel n juris-
diction which a nation may exoroise within its owi bound-
aries whether they be I :i or sea, Ls be.l ie,
it i? not oily feasiolo, but practical end ; 1 as well,
to m fioherV?~, luestion from the territorial seas
ouestioi,
other areas of extra-territorial rights this dis-
tinction ms already been drawn. The breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea does not affect the coastal state's ri^ht to
protect itself by re jIc means nor the assertion of
its sov to the natural resources of the
* shelf, nor the enforcement if its customs,
fiscal, ration and sanitation laws and reflations in
a eontiruous zone* These interest are a source of
22. Ml eliminating an unnecessary and contentious
nroblem, perhaps there would be a better capability
of arriving at an agreement on the breadth of those
seas within which a coastal nation may exercise its
lets sovereignty. In essence, of course, tr
U. "'.- a nronosal at the I960 Geneva Convent!
arm* the distinction between fishing rights and
territorial jurisdiction in its 6-raile territorial
at 6-mile ex rishi mo proposal,
ot the proposal have had a better ce of
id it been divided into two distinct pro-
posals a t the le^ral-nolltical-economic ir ' ices
. its sepan
feet the passage of the other part?
10
i£M
legitimate concern to every coastal state, but they oan
be adequately protected by the imposition of reasonable
controls on the use of the high seas without the neces-
sity of a broad territorial sea, *
illtary Advantages of a Broad Territorial Sea
The United States would not have to defend the three*
mile limit unless other nations felt that there were com-
pelll/k: reasons for its replacement . The protection of
Hilling interests is one of the most frequently expressed
reasons. 2^ While other economic, social, and t>olitical
reasons have also been given, it is submitted that an
equally compelling reason is the substantial military
benefit to be gained. This has seldom been advanced as a
reason for extension for the motive behind such extensions
is not always honorable. It results in a benefit to a
nation that is trying to disrupt international commerce
and is willing to risk violating the law in order to
23. "or another treatment of this thesis see
516-20.
2*t. is interest in fisheries • . . overshadows all
other particular interests that mi^ht be advanced to
justify the extension." tgal 71. rhis Is an
"extravagance" since authority in a territorial sea
is muGh more comprehensive than is necessary for con«
trol of flshi | .•. 16^ 71-?**.
11

promote its goal of domination. As the legal effects of
a broad territorial sea are discussed more fully below,
the importance of this benefit and the threat to freedom
which it imposes should become obvious. It is the vision
of this threat that prompts this study of what has been
called "one of the most controversial questions in con-
temporary international law.* 2
*
25. onsen, yaw of the Sea , Int'l Cone. No. 520, at
22*2 (1953). Tof, orensen was the ih ^nw-




STATUS OP THE THREE-KILE LI HIT
Kb order to appreciate the Importance of a narrow
territorial sea to the defense of the Free world, it is
necessary to understand the status of the three-mile
limit and some of the forces at woric, both behind the
scenes and out on the international stage, to broaden
it. 26
A, Extensions of breadth
As long ago as 1793, the United States adopted a
three-mile limit to Its territorial sea2? and in 179^
Congress decreed that "cognisance of complaints, by whom-
soever instituted, in oases of captures made within the
waters of the United States or within a marine league
^fthree nautical miles or 3»^53 statute miles' of the
coasts or shores thereof" would be subject to the juris-
diction of the United States District Court. 2 Since
26. See lieinsen, rn£ riirae-Xjle Limit: Preserving the
freedom of the Seas . 11 Stan. L. :iev, J97 (1959) for
a concise, comprehensive history of the origin of the
concent of a territorial sea and its width.
27. See Brlttln ft Watson, International Law for Seagoing
Officers 5^ (2d ed. i960).




1793 lb has been the tradl'cl ;itlon of the United
States that tho throe-mile Halt io not only domestic
law but "h cognizable under Inter-
na I the greatest br^ rfilch conforms to
'Otrino of the freedo bhe seas,
ipreiae Court bates expressed
judicial cognizance of the United ft position vhen,
ki Cunard v. Mellon »'? It noted that*
It is now settled in the United States and
reco^ized elsewhere that the territory subject
s jurisdiction includes ... a marginal belt
of the sea extending from the coastline outward a
rlne , three geographical miles,
3@ of the wfrds "recognized elsewhere** by the
Court must be rpreted as meaning "recognized by some
ier countries" rather than "recognized bf all maritime
states"' foi iiO'ioy toon of the three-mile limit was ev
the > to wane*
"y 1950 | di s over the breadth of territorial
seas had become prominent enough to be considered by the
Hague Codification Conference. rost of the parti cloatir
nations favored either a three-mile or a six-mile breadth.
. 262 U.C. 100, at 122 (1921).
14
.
Only the Soviet Union cl ' ,50
Although It avpmx *ater -'ere Hilling
to accent ft bhroe-mile Unit, the matter of the reooTiitlon
of a conti tm customs, fiiftftl|
iWu'. Lo , and I -ols, wa
discussion and votin . ince there ware not a sufficient
number of etatec i ?r of 30th a three-nile limit and
a contiguous zone, the Conference was concluded without
reaching agreement; on the oreadth of lh« territorial sea.
;o birth of the United nations, a new attempt
was to be made to ootai to an international decision as
to tL ftl breadth of ^rritorlal sen. The Intern/ -
tioial EM commission of the United nations studied ftll
facets of the law of the sea and completed itg final
draft report- to the General Assembly in 195&. As to
the breadth of the territorial sea, the Commission was
less than specific. It approached the question in this
manner
t
1. The Commission recognizes that interna-
tional practice is not uniform as regard-? the de-
li I -ion of the territorial sea.
30, iloOousal 536,








tional law does not permit an extension \e
territorial eea
3«
as to the breadth of the territorial sea 1 that
fixed a breadth greater tlian three miles and, 01 fefci
breadth *T ' iat of their own territorial sea Is
• rt as a , Ht4 fait
ilat^. Terence on the if the ? met In Geneva,
Switzerland, fro ; Zk to April lt| LpJ .
One product of i#e was a Cony an
the r«n. M and the . .^ Its
twenty-throe ..antive articles summarise NTl of the
law oi . -1 seti. Cd&gplottouslj' absent is any
affiriaation of the brc:v :£ the territorial se .
32. Jii.«*t« .
33, iers r referred to as the !$$• Geneva Confe-
3*+. Id a** \oe with the rales of the Conference, rat-
ification of the Conventions must be given by 2.2
.
efere the Cenventlen will enter Into for. .
As o i«ary 21 states had ratified the Con-
vent! oil on the Territorial
Zone. While it ir rally anticipated that at
I*: -^ore state will ratify this Convention,
putting it into force, tv ence of ratift-
aoas not affect the importance of the Con-
vention as a current restatement of international
1 *3a,1ority of the
delegations oresent.

Despite the enormous number of matters upon which
agreement was reached , the delegates could not arrive at
a breadth agreeable to at least two-thirds of the delegates,
as required by Conference procedural rules. 35
The Convention describes the limits of the terri-
torial sea by saying only that "The outer limit of ter-
ritorial sea is the line every point of which is at a
distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to
the breadth of the territorial sea. "36 A review of the
Conference record, however, leaves little doubt but that
the vast majority of the delegations present disapprove
of a territorial sea of a greater breadth than twelve
miles, but this was not retained in the Convention itself.
The United States delegation entered the Conference
with the strong belief that the three-mile limit was firmly
established in international law. To support this con-
clusion, the United States delegation could rely not only
on the historical claims of most coastal nations, but also
on the tact that more states, and among them most of the
35. Required by rule 35(1) for matters of substance.
U.N. DOC HO. A/CONF. 13/35 (1953).
36. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the




Jor maritime powers, adhered to the three-mile limit
than to any other single limit. 3? While this is an im-
pressive statement, it must also be remembered, oartlcu-
larly when assessing the results of the Conference, that,
of the seventy-three coastal states in attendance, hardly
more than twenty adhered to the three-mile rule at the
time the Conference oonvened.^8
Among the dissenters were Chile, 39 Ecuador, and Peru*
which claimed 200 miles in order to protect their fisheries.
Canada and Iceland desired twelve-miles for the same reason.
37. Sorensen, J8upra_ note 25, at 244,
38. Id. at 2*4-3. For a summary of the 1956 positions of
maritime nations see MaeChesney, situation, Doc-
uments and Commentary on Recent Developments in the
International Law of the Sea, 51 Haval 'Jar College
Blue 3ook Series, 439-501 (1957).
39. The Chilian vote against the United States compromise
proposal of six miles is alleged to have laeen made not
out of oposltion to the proposal but in retaliation
for the recommendation of the U.S. Secretary of the
Interior that the United States restore tariffs on
copper. See Dean, X'he Geneva Conference on the I<aw
of the Seas What Was Accomplished * 52 Am. J. Int'l
L. SO?, at 616 (1953). However, Chile, by Presidential
Declaration, had claimed a 200-mile breadth since June
25 » 1947. Great Britain Central Office of Information,
The rerritorial Sea 4-5 (i960).
40. By Presidential Decree of Mov. 2, 1949. Ibid, .
18
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India, Surma, Thailand, Cambodia, Korea and South Viet
Nam wanted an extension of the three-mile limit in order
to restrict Japanese fishing. The PhiliDpines and
Indonesia asserted SDecial rights in large areas of the
high seas which would close important navigation and aerial
routes to and between India, Australia and New Zealand.
And the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with
its satellite bloc and several Arab states, wanted a
twelve-mile limit, predominantly for political-military
purposes.^ In addition, SI Salvador, as a part of its
Constitution, issued September 7, 1950, claimed 200 miles
and Argentina, by a decree dated October 11, 1946, claimed
all of its "epicontinental sea and continental shelf. "^2
With all of these divergent views and special in-
terests, it became apparent that a two—thrids majority of
states at the Conference would not support a three-mile
41. See Dean, Freedom of the Seas , 37 Foreign Affairs 83
(1953).
42. Great Britain Central Office of Information, The
Territorial Sea 4-5(1960). Other states having re-
cently extended their claims to 12 miles were Panama
in Dec. 1953, China (People's -republic) and United
Arab Republic in Sept. 1958, Iraq and Saudi Arabia
in Nav. 1958, Libya in Bareh 1959* Iran in April
1959 > and Ethiopia since 1953. Ib^.d. with regard
to the Panama claim, it should be noted that the effect
is to require all ships passing through the Canal Zone
to first pass through Panamanian territorial waters.
This results from the fact that territorial sea of the
Canal £one only extends out 3 miles. Ibid . Thus,
recognition of Panama's claim would mean that she could








limit. In an effort to reach agreement, the United States
delegation orooosed the "six-plus-six 1* compromise previously
mentioned.^ Of all the proposals at the Conference rel-
ative to the breadth of the territorial sea, this proposal
received the most votes. It failed of passage by only
seven votes. *
A second Conference was convened in Geneva in i'aroh
i960 with an agenda limited to two questions! the breadth
of the territorial sea. and the fishery limits. It was
generally recognized at this Conference that ft proposal
to retain the three-mile limit had no chance of passage.
Therefore, the United States and Canada joined to submit
a proposal, similar to the "six-plus-six" compromise pro-
posal introduced by the United States at the 1958 Geneva
Conference. Because of the requirement that two-thirds
of those voting must be in favor, the proposal was de-
feated by one vote. Mo other proposal regarding the breadth
of the territorial sea or fishing limits having survived,
the Conference was concluded without adopting any proposal
on the t^ro questions jofore it.
43. See n. 9 supra .
¥*. See 2 Off. Rec. 39, U.N. Doc. No.A/CONf. 13/38 (1958).
20

With the failure of a second conference to reach
two-thirds agreement on the subject, one- may ask with
some concern what the present law is. Writing in i960,
Professor Carl Franklin contended that:
While it is true that in recent years the
world has witnessed an inert ; number of claims
- coastal states to a wider territorial sea, the
long history of state practice iy the principal
ritime states surmorts the conclusion that the
three-mile limit still aore nearly represents cus-
tomary international law than any other figure.
Certainly this mlninuu jreadth of territorial sea
represents the most rational preference viewed from
the perspective of the world, community for achieving
the maximum utilization of the high seas .^5 (Citations
omitted)
At the conclusion of the 1958 Geneva Conference, *<
Dean presented a somewhat more unequivocal stand.
It is. . .unwarranted to assume that the
traditional three-mile limit of the territorial
sea is no longer international law. All efforts
to agree on a new figure failed. The fact that
a two-thirds vote could not be obtained in favor
of the three-mile limit shows merely a desire on
the part of many nations to extend their territorial
sea, not that such an gxtension in international law
has been accomplished.
It will come as no surprise to learn that Professor
Grl :ory Tunkin, the chairman of the Soviet delegation,
disagreed. Professor Tunkin was adamant In stating that
"It was conclusively shown in speeches to the Conference
45. Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Develop-
ments, 53 Naval War College Blue 3ook Series 89 (1961).
k6. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea t
What VfalTAcconrollshed
, 52 Am. J. Int«l 607, at 6*16 (1953).
21
!
that the 3-mile limit is not and never has been a generally
recognized rule in the law of the sea. The Conference
once and for all buried the 3-mile limit legend,
"
**? Not
in the least oonceeding the correctness of Professor
Tunlcin's conclusion, Mr. Dean summarized United States
oolioy at the end of the 1958 Geneva Conference and re-
iterated the same policy at the close of the I960 Con-
ference. He wrote:
We have made it clear from the beginning that
in our view the 3-aiile rule is and will continue to
be established international law, to which we ad-
here. It is the only breadth of the territorial
sea on which there has ever been anything like
common agreement. Unilateral acts of states claim-
ing greater territorial seas are not only not sanc-
tioned by any principle of international law but,
are indeed in conflict with the universally accepted
principle of freedom of the seas. . . .
We have made it clear that in our view there
is no obligation on the part of States adhering to
the 3-mile rule to recognize claims on the part of
other States to a greater breadth of territorial
sea. On that we stand.
^
Since the termination of the I960 Geneva Conference
there have been a number of states which have unilaterally
V?. Tunkin, The Geneva conference on the Law of the Sea .
Int'l Affairs h7 (Noscow, 195B); 3 Off. Rec 163-69
i
U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/38 » at 37 (1958).





extended their territorial ceas. 1*? Indonesia has reit-
erated its claim to twelve miles. Albania, Malagasy
aeoublio, and Sudan have joined the twelve-mile group.
Cameroon now elalms six miles and Senegal, South Africa,
Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay have adopted the "six plus
sir" formula proposed by the united States and Canada at
the I960 Geneva Conference. Horoeeo and Norway claim a
twelve-mile fishing zone. Denmark has extended the
fisheries iiasits around Greenland from three to twelve
miles and Canada has announced Its intention to do the
ease in ald-iay of 1?64 in order »otect Canada's
fiohin*? indur
All in all, over forty states now elaim territorial
seas of various widths greater than three miles51 and
while, despite these defections, there are still more
states reoogniging the three-mile limit than any other
49. See letter of . . Assistant Seerotary of >tate
»>utton to a. 1 . senator r-ruenlng, reprinted in 109
C*a«. lee. 11279-30 (1>6'3).




single breadth, one wonders whether the three-mile rule
is not a lost cause. Are not the cautious words of Pro-
fessor Franklin that 'the three-mile limit still more
nearly represents customary international law than any
other figure, M ^2 more realistic than the flat statement
of v r. Dean that the three-mile rule "will continue to be
established international law." 33
In view of the United States conclusion at the i960
Geneva conference that it would be useless to propose a
three-mil© limit and the number of States that have in-
creased their territorial seas since that time, it would
seem that the era of the three-mile limit is fast drawing
to a cloas. To borrow a simile from jJr. Jorge 3ocobo of
the Philippine delegation at the 1958 Geneva Conference,
have we not witnessed the death of H9r« Xhreemiles and now
are watohing his heirs, Mr. Sixmlles and Mr. Twelvemiles
argue over the settlement of the estate.
To carry the analogy further, however, until the
estate is settled — until the heirs know how they will
fare under the Will — H% ihreemiles still weilds some
influence, While the eract limit to be recognized in
52. Franklin, op. olt. supra note ^5.
Dean, F
91 (195





international lav 1b unsettled and In a confused state,
the United r.tatee Is still in a position, holding to the
three-nil© rule, to ne«rotiate, seek conoessions, and, in
general, insure that its interests are protected from the
adverse effects of an internationally recognised extensi
shoul viteriallze.
B. Extensions of Baseline
thou,sch astresaent on a breadth for the territorial
sea is someday reached, that will not completely settle
the r>ro 'ilcms in this area. So far we have been concerned
with thr 1$ ~ end of the territorial sea, but
a+fsaarilj l» the breadth of this sea is the
problem of it --lnnlnr; that is what is to be used as
the inner limit, the starting point from which to measure
the * on di»*Ml<if What is the baseline?
While r 1 nethods by which to determine a base-
ll.o .rspoeed.51* there are, currently. t«o «ay»
which have been internationally recognized. The difference
,
At ie Conference the United States pro-
DOf?er] an "arc of circles method whereby a ehlo
imply draw a circle around itself, the
radius he width of the territorial
is If the circle touched land at any place,
the > was within a territorial sen. od
was again introduced by the United States at the
19 leva Conference* It failed to receive ap-
prov either conference. In the meantime, Great
Britain t to rely on it in the Fisheries
£\9$\J I.C.J. Rep, 116. The court stated in its
opinion that "It is not obligatory by law," &n& re-




resulting from these two ways are ofter. enormous. The
first method has met with the widest usage. In this
method the baseline follows the shoreline, curving in
and out in accordance with the irre itles of the
shore. ile there has not been complete agreement among
the afctltni usin-T this method as to where the shoreline
is — high water mark, low tide mark, or where the sea
becomes navigable — the low tide line wa« adopted by the
ITorth Sea Fisheries Convention of 1862 between Great
arasany, um, Denmark, France and The
Netherlands ,55 and il&a generally been adopted in the
oraotice of states, 56 ^e second method for setting a
-line seems to have been established, as far back as
1604 i -ames i of England decreed that imaginary
Unas be draim from headland to headland on the coast of
'ociaiiaed the waters landward of these lines
to be domain or 'kind's chambers.* 5? In modern
parlance we would call them ''internal waters." Although
55. Convention for jlice of Morth >3ea
Fisheries, art. 2, Porei ri lei. n.s. kjA (188?).
56. Z""l951_7 I.C.J, leo. 116, at 128.




the "king's chambers" doctrine was reject i the
arbitration between the United States and Great Britain
concerning the ship Washington in 1354, ~K -' the headland
to headland method of setting baselines continued to be
used by some few nations. In 1949 a rebirth was given
to this method when, in the An^Io-Horwaglaa fisheries
Case, 5^ Great Britain contested a 1935 Norwegian decree
in which the straight baseline method was used to delimit
the territorial sea off Norway's northern coast. In a
lengthy opinion which cites Norway's historic use of
straight Koselines, its economic advantage to the inhab-
itants of the area, and its usefulness in delimitir
W*%g*4 HMH| the court determined, by ten votes to two,
that the method employed for the delimitation of the
fisheries zone by the decree was not contrary to inter-
national law.
58. 4 :oore, International Arbitration 4342 (1898),
ashin ,bon was sell '.lie fishinr, in the Bay
of Fundy, 10 miles off Annapolis, -iova Gootia, The
ritish claimed that the bay was inland waters since
a line drawn from headland to headland would have
this effect. The arbiter found that the area was
too large *;o be considered a bay,
59. Fisheries Ca3e, £"1951.7 I.C.J. Rep, 116.




The opinion has been expressed that the courts
finding "cannot be held . • ./""to have_7 created a pre-
cedent since it dealt with a unique geographical con-
iration of a coast which — as the court repeatedly-
said — was 'exceptional'."-^- Logic and reasonableness,
as well U the repeated statement of the court , uphol
this opinion as to the appll cation of the court's opinion.
Some nations, however, sec to extend their territorial
seas, generally for economic reasons,^2 have ignored it
and have resorted to the baseline system even though their
coast3 do not conform to the " exceptional'* situation in
the Fisheries Case * In April 1950, the Icelandic minis-
tries of 'isheries, relying on the oleadlngs of Norway in
the Fisheries Case * issued regulations prohibiting all
trawling and Danish seine-net tin*, within an area four
miles seawai"d of baselines drawn from the outermost points
of its northern coast. Despite protests from other nations,
on Mu * 1952, after the decision in the Fisheries Case .
61. Colombos, International law of the :;ea 106 (5th ed.
1962) /""hereinafter cited as Colombos^/.




Iceland confirmed its orevious action and extended it to
all coasts. ^3 Instead of smoothing out an exceptionally
rugged ooast, the Icelandic regulation had the effect of
squaring o±f the coastline and including large areas of
the high seas within their internal and territorial waters.
Canada has also declared its intention to use the
straight baseline method. In his statement to the House
of Commons, ^ Prime Minister Pearson said that:
^VjThe Canadian Government has decided to
establish a 12 mile exclusive fisheries zone
along the whfrle of da's coastline as of mld-
iy, l?6*r, and to impl the straight aaseline
system at the same time as the basis from which
ad&'e territorial sea ^elusive fisheries
zone shall be measured.
Considering that Canada possesses the world's longe
coastline ,°^ it is readily rent that this decision
by the 4ian government, if recognized, will create
large new areas of inland and territorial waters out of




63. Laws and Regulations on the .le^ime, of the Territorial
Sea, U.LJ. Doc, 'o. TV V . .3/6, at 516 (1956).




An Interesting sidelight in thle area is the ease of
California, As a result of the Supreme courts decision
in the tldeiand cases, California aoted to recover the
territorial sea and other parts of the continental shelf
which had thereby bean taken away fro* her. Her aethodi
in reliance noon the Fisheries Case she drew a straight
baseline, 67 Thus she claimed to hare pushed the territorial
sea outward and to have recovered as inland waters 9 la*
portent parts of her previous territorial sea.
Other evidences of the rebirth of the straight base*
line are the previously mentioned oases of th© Philippines
and Indonesia.69 Until December 13» 1957 • Indonesia had
claimed, as its territorial waters* a distance measured
outward for three miles from each island. On that date
the council of <ini store of the ileoublic of Indonesia
66. LV. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, at 29*33 U9'*7).
6?. Calif. Stats. 19**?, c. 6s # a. S2» Sao. 1 (Calif.
v*t Code, Sec. 170).
66. See note 1 supra,.
See p.6J,& note 2
30
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declared70 that, henceforth, the thousand? of island staking
up the Republic would be considered aa a tingle archipelago
within straight baselines connecting the protrusions of
the outermost islands. Thus, not only were all of the
Islands to be treated as a single unit, out all waters
between those islands were to be a part of the same unit,
and therefore, internal waters of Indonesia, The Council
also, by this sane declaration, sought to extend the
territorial seas of Indonesia from a three-ail® width around
each island to a twelve~!aile width measured outward from
the newly declared straight baselines. On February IB,
i960, this declaration was reworked into a government
order entitled "angulation in Lieu of Act Ho, 4* and
promulgated over tha signature of President Sukarno.?*
A map was Included on which the exact baselines were
imprinted. 7
70. See note 12 sjj&r&.
71. Translation oublished in Addendum to Sudp. to the




As might be expected, these unil 1 dec ions
by the Indonesian government met with the di oval of
most of those maritime nations which had, throughout his-
tory, used the important and much traveled straits and
waters around Indonesia.?- In an effort to counter this
111—UJiHifl j pv were submitted nt the 195° Geneva
Conference which would \ roved the Indonesian
proclamation of December 13, 1957 •?-''a These prop**mlt
were withdrawn, ?^ however, and the legality of such
extension of territorial seas and inland waters h
continued to be contested. Fortunately, Indonesia has
not pressed its claim to such an extent that serious
conflict would arise. 7
73. For the United States response to the Indonr claim
see ri.I. Times, Ja. IS, 1953, p. 3, col. 1. For other
protests see Syatauw, Some a'ewly 11 shed Asian
the Development of International Law 17**-
75 (1961).
73a. Philippine oro-jDsal of Auril 1, 1958, U.N, Doc.
.
' »1/L«98 «a4 Yugoslavian nronosal of March
26 , 1958 , U.N. Do c . • o . A/CON? , 1 3/C . 1/L
.
7^. The Philippine proposal was withdrawn on April 16,
1958 » 1st Cona. Summary Rec, 3 Off. Hec. 1^8, U.N.
0, Mo. A/CONF. 13/39 (1958). AOn April 17, the
Yi. vian proposal was withdrawn presumably be-
cause the question needed "further study". Id. at
I62-63.




bh the International Law Commission and the 1958
Genev 3-nce, orized the use of the straight
baseline method, but limited it to deeply indented ooasts
or situations where there are numerous coastal islands. ?5
?5. The articles of the Convention which are pertinent
to the selection of ollows:
rtlela ;
"Except where othe provided in these articles,
tii Line for measuring the breadth of
the territorial ees If the " 3 alo<
t' ed on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coas J
rtl«li
"1# In localities where the c is deeply
I idented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of
islands alon-- the .mediate vicinity,
straight bastllnas joining appron-
ri >oints may be «mploysd in drawing the baseline
fro -e breadth of the territorial sea is
measured
.
o dra-. :>f such baselines must not depart
to any appreelable sxta&t 1 the general direo-
'on Ox" the the sea areas lying within
the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to
the i omain to be subject to the regime of in-
ternal waters.
Baselines shall not be drawn to and from lc
tide elevations unless lighthouses or similar in-
stallations which are permanently above sea level
have heen built on them,
jre the method of straight baselines is a>-
pll cable under rovir,: of paragraph 1,
account may be taken In determining' particular
baselines, of e peculiar to the
r; concerned, the reality and the 1- ^ce of
tthich are clearly erio by a long usage.
Ch« system of straight baselines may not be
applied b^ tate in such a manner as to cut off
from thehi^h seas the territorial sea of another
33

Proa this wording a controversy has now arisen as to
whether or not the straight baseline method can be
lied to mi m groups of islands.' In other
words, does the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous .'one authorize the use of straight base-
lines to connect the islands of an archipelago State?
Considering the wording of the Convention itself,
together with its close resemblence to the conclusion
of the Internation Court of .Justice in the Fisheries
!,?? with its specialized geographical
75. (Cont»d)
"6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight
baselines on charts, to which due publicity must be
given,
"Article 5
"l. Waters on the landward ride of the baseline of
the territorial sea form part of the internal waters
of the State.
M 2. ,;here the establishment of a straight baseline in
accordance with article k has the effect of enclosing
as internal waters areas which previously had been con-
sidered as part of the territorial sea or of the high
seas, a right of innocent passage, as provided in
articles l4 to 23, shall exist in those waters.
"
76. See Sorensen, Law of the Sea t Int f i Cone. ^Jo. 520,
•40 (195B). The United States has its own in-
ternal problem in this In the form of the
Rawalin Islands, In 1963 an inter-island "sky bus"
•l r .ced in operation. -"'ince the operations had
tentative state aporoval but not federal approval, a
dispute arose as to whether the plane was flying inter-
state (leaving the territorial area of Hawaii, flying
over international waters, and then re-entering Hawaii)
or intra-state (on the theory that the waters between
the islands are a part of the state). The outcome of
the case will be most interesting in view of the in-
ternational declarations of the United states.
77. See p. 2? sgpra,
34

situation, It Is doubtful whether the Convention provision
can be so interpreted.
?
78. The lerallty of use of the straight baseline meth
by 01 o arciiip : »s In an unsettled question.
For articles deali th the question see Svensen,
.1
. ^cts oonoemln^ the Delimitation of
the Terri torial Waters o~ Inel-yog s , 1 Off. fee.
.
*
>oc. .10. A, .1*3/37 (195^); 3orensen,
sur>ra note 76 » at 239; and Dean, The Second Qonev
og the X4iv of the r.- : The rj-.ht for
Freedom of the 3eas
,





ADVSHSS SPPECTS OF "'ION OF THE TERRITOBIAL SEA
A. General Introduction
Prom the foregoing it appears that efforts are being
made to extend the territorial seas by many means, the two
most important being by an extentlon of the breadth of the
territorial sea itself and by the use of straight baselines
from which to begin the measurement. The situation re-
garding the breadth of the territorial sea is in a state
of flux but change from old accepted practices seems
inevitable. This discussion of the adverse effects of
the change is designed primarily to indicate why that
change must be forestalled as long as Dossible. It should
also point up areas in which action must be taken to pre-
serve as many of the military advantages to the Free
world of the three-mile limit as possible when greater
limits become recognized in international law.
The nations of the world have OBen prompted to ad-
vocate a narrower or a broader territorial sea for a
number of reasons. Chief among them are security, fishing,
and economic factors other than fishing.
36
©
In 1702, the Dutch writer, Cornelius van fiynicershoelc,
authored the maxim "potestatem terrae finirl, ubi flnltur
armorum vls. M?9 Although perhaps not literal/' this
aaxia aay be contextually translated as "the territory
sovereignty ends where • ic eads.^l This
was an early expression of the concept that the territorial
sea shou" measured bf the actual rAnge of coastal
•smnon, Mthough ily wide breadths would now be
required, the military ^tion of "defendability,"
which set a narrow limit in 1702, is still j ur^ed
as the criteria to B#4U , It il used to
expand the breadth of the territorial sea for ed
security reason .
Despite the advent of intercontinental oallistlc
missiles and the accompanying reduction in the importance
79. Jynkershoek, io aris Dissertatio, first
publish minted inora 36^
Utio : ecu? id- 17*44).
80. In a translatio sffin in The Classics of In-
ternational Law *M* (Scott ed. 1923) , the word
"control" rather than "sovereignty" is user.
81. As interpreted by walker, -Territorial : r:-terg; The
Cannon Shot ilviX e , 22 irit. Yb. Int 1 ! h. 210, at 211-
(19^5).
82. See the Ceylonese and Saudi Arabian references to the
shot rule at the 195$ Geneva Conference, 3
Off. See. 27 t 36. U.N. Doc. Mo. A/COM?. 13/39 (195
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of a wide territorial sea for orotective purposes,
security remains as a major consideration for some
nations. ^3 Those who pre o-oorehensive about the use of
large fleets against them, such as the use of the United
States fleet off Lebanon in 1958 t assume that those nations
who advocate a narrow limit do so for military or politi-
cal reasons inconsistent with the security of the coastal
nation. ?»uch nations, stressing the proximity of large
fleets, urge a broader territorial sea in order to move
the threat further away. Onoosed to this rationale are
those nations which see a greater threat to their own
OJ.
security in the broad territorial sea. ^ For Instance,
the United States has urged the retantion of the three-
mile limit in order to protect against an increase in
violations of neutral waters and In order to ensure the
unrestricted use of as many straits and sea areas as
83. For a general discussion srtlng the absence of a
I iem need for a wide territorial sea for defense
purposes in view of modem weapons, see McDougal 516-20.
84. In a statement made before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 20, I960, Kr, Dean has commented
that "U.S. defensive capabilities would be so pro-
foundly jeopardized by our acceptance of a greater
than 6-mile territorial sea thr t those responsible for
planning for our defense have concluded that we must
ta&e a position against such a course in any event,"
42 Dep't State Bull. 251, at 260.
wM
possible for the effeotlve operation of a deterrent fleet
and its supporting merchant vessels.
There are numerous economic effects which would
result from an increase in the breadth of the territorial
seas, such M the increased cost of navigational aids, the
expense of rerouting airlines to avoid illegal overflight,
the rerouting of merchant ships to avoid hampering regu-
lations, and loss or increase of subsurface maritime
imalth includin g fish, other sea life and minerals. The
effects of military significance, however, can for the
most MUPt be classified under one heading: passage. Is
there innocent passage in territorial waters, and, if so,
what is innocent and what is passage? Nfeftt limitations
can be imposed unon nap by the littoral state? H
oan these limitations affect deployment and mobility of a
sea or air force? "hat effect does neutrality have on
passage?
In consider!Q 11 of these matters, there is or
observation that must be kept in mind. There is a tre-
mendous contrast between the geographic situation of the
Free world and that of the Communist bloc. For the most
part, the Communist world is .in a neat package of land-
39
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connected states. True, It Is gaining a few unoonn;
outposts now, suoh as Cuba, and poi
the great bulk: of the Communist f' Ft still connected.
by railways, highways, and transcontinental airways.
Opposed to this, the Free world Is m c confederation.
Its connecting lines are oceans and str
rvlval of the Free world nations li on
their freedom to use the seas.°* one may t tlessly
argue that the sea Is a li and t >8l of three
million er of free sea by the extension of ter-
ritorial li still leave plenty of . It is
not a qusrtion of having plenty of room. It Is a question
of havii) MM where it is needed. Bf it !;ic8,
surveillance of coast line, • MB the air or sea,
ie nine miles better from three miles off the coast than
it Is fi elve, and adequate r>ho : id vi
intelligence are fltftl -:o many military opera fcions.
Conversely, of what good as a show of strength is i fleet
stationed I r off-shore that it cannot o® seen.
85« See ller, Implications of Soviet. Sea ?ower . published
in The Soviet N!avy 299, at 30^-09, 326-2? (Saunders ed.
195B), for a fact-filled article Mipeeitlttg the asser-
tion that -rid is an oceanoiyraohic confeder-
ation dependent on sea comnrani cations.
**0

Consider also the fate of unhampered passage through
straits. Of the thlrty-ei^ht leading straits in the world,
one study has shown that only three would remain open as
high seas under a twelve mile territorial sea regime. 80
Most of the maritime highways of the world would fall
within the restrictions of territorial waters if the
breadth of such waters were extended to twelve miles. 8?
Relying on this difference in geographic configuration,
the Communists may well be seeking to weaken the Free
world's lines of communication and to restrict the effect-
iveness of its defenses by broadening territorial seas. 88
86. See Kennedy, A Brief Geographical and Hydro^raphlcal
Study of Straits Which Constitute Routes for Inter-
national Traffic . U.N. Doc. No. A/COMF.13/4Add. 1
(1957), published in U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/37, at 114
(1957). See Appendix A for examples of affected
straits around the world.
87. See Dean's statement before the 4th meeting of the
Committee of the Whole on larch 20, I960, i960 Off.
Rec. 46, oara. 11, U.M. Doc. Ho. A/CONF.19/8j state-
ment of Farls 3ey el-Khouni, 1 ILC Yb. 213 (1956).
88. See Wieholl, Oeo&raphy and Strategy . published In The
Soviet Navy 243, at 2^-4 (Saunders ed. 1958), where
H/ADM. Nicholl states that "by every conceivable means
of diplomacy, subversion, propaganda and by the active
support of nationalist movements /Russiajr.
. . has
sought, not without success, to weaken the network of
bases available to the rest of the world. 3 rtHer
object is to ensure that her naval forces are in a







The Husslan leaders are not unaware of the dependence
of the Free Korld on communications. Hear Admiral AndreeT
of the Soviet \favy has stated that American troops abroad
and all of the NATO Allies are so dependent upon trans-
oceanic suooly that they "cannot conduct wide scale combat
operations" without it. According to the Admiral " the
very possibility of conductin/r war depends /"for the
•imperialist • statesjf upon the support of uninterrupted
operation of sea and ocean communications « h8° "The Soviet
leaders have thoroughly grasped the main lesson of both
world wars, namely, that the Allies were very nearly de-
feated at sea, and only achieved victory by making a
supreme effort to control their sea communication .
1—1111 Tig these facts, Soviet strategists have given to
their submarines, as one of their substantial missions,
the interdiction of the sea communications of the Free
world. 91
89. Andreev, Sea and Ocean Communications In Contemporary
War . Krasnaia -r, 1 -.., Mril 25, 1957 1 quoted in Garthoff,
Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age 202 {Rev. ed. 1962).
90. iUcholl, supra note 38 at 2$HMt,
91. Garthoff , supra note B;. ;/or another recent apprilsal
of the role of the Soviet submarine see ^aeintyre, The




Innocent passage is a Pandora's box of troublesome
problems, the tot> of which will be opened even further
by the extension of territorial limits and more of its
contents will pour out to plague international harmony.
The legal issues involved in innocent passage problems,
to one extant or another, embrace most of the ills, of a
military nature, evolving from an extension of territorial
seas. It is, therefore, the first area of concern to be
discussed in detail. Other effects will later be singled
out for comment, but primarily as applications of the
legal issues to be discussed in this section.
At the outset it will be advantageous to consider
three matters which are not included in the so-called
"right" of innocent passage? Submerged passage, over-
flight, and internal waters.
1. submerged Passage
Under article l*f, paragraph 6, of the Convention on
Territorial Sea &a& the Contiguous zone, "Submarines are
required to navigate on the surface and to show their
flagn when operating within the territorial waters of
another state. The requirement that a submarine naviga^
on the surface in territorial waters unless it has permis-
sion to do otherwise is a well-recognized customary rule
43
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in International law and was recommended by the Internatior
Law Commission.^2 Recognition of the rule by the United
States is evidenced by Navy Regulations^ which direct?
".
• • nor shall submarines be submerged within . • ,
territorial waters without . , . oermlssion /"from the
government of the country concerned.J7U While violation
of this rule is rather easily accomplished, and of great
benefit to the violator, as will be discussed later, its
violation, when deteoted, is considered a serious matter.
Note, for instance, an Argentine response to a suspected
submersion. According to an Argentine government renort,
on May 21, 1958* an unidentified, submerged submarine was
sunk by Argentine vessels within territorial waters be-
cause It had not surfaced and shown its flag as required.
While later information disclosed that the suooosed sub-
marine was merely a false contact, the incident illustrates
92. Articl Ling the Law of the .lea , sec. 15(5)
»
93. • • tfavy . L9M| nee. 0622(k)
.
9k. See N.X. Times, May 2k, IfJ . 1, col. t, for ft
report of this incident.
kk
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the seriousness of detected disobedience. Thus, for a
country that is concerned with world opinion and is trying
to abide by international law, a submarine must rise and
proceed to navigate on the sun ;here its agility Is
dcci eased.
Under present day conditions, why is such a rule
necessary? If the commander of submarine wishes to
pass innocently through a territorial sea, what difference
does |t maice whether he is under or on ton of the sea?
The main difference, of course, Is that his presence,
nationality, and purpose is more obvious if he is sur-
faced. Does this requirement really nrotect the coastal
state today? If the submarine is present to launch an
attack:, a mere twelve miles is not ?oing to stop it.
Missiles fired from submerged submarines have a greater
range than that. There is no longer the need in every
instance for risking the ffi rs of coming into a harbor
or close to shore in order to strike. And if close
proximity is required, a surfaced submarine can get
closer to its target in peace time. Since the main danger
in peacetime is from surprise attack and that cannot be
eliminated by a twelve-mile territorial sea, do not the
inconvenience of the rule to the submarine outweight its
benefits to the coastal state? True, if a submarine must
*5

surface while /:oing through a strait, a migration of
submarines from one area to another would he more easily
detected, but if the purpose of the migration were an
attack, ther. kittle reason to anticipate eomplianos
with the surfacing reriulrement anyway. Coastal underwater
detection devises are not yet so effective that a submarine
is deprived of a better chance of secrecy if submerged.
Under wartime conditions the only application of the
rule vould be in neu; •**« While the rule is justi-
fied as a protection tion of neuti ters,
this situation does not Justify a blanket rule cover!/
other situations as well.
verfllrjrit
Another araa where innocent passage has no application,
is in overflight. An airnlane has no right of innocent
passage over the territorial waters of a nation. '-> The
result of this restriction is drastic. A submarine can
surface and become entitled to the same right of innocent
passage as a surface warshio. An airplane is dependent
upon treaties an eementp.




Although eminently important in all types of transit,
whether on, under, or over the sea, it is in this area of
overflight that certain seo.graphical facts of life are
most po; . of the more important narrow passages
conn^r
M
>f water are seas under
a three- tTitorial limit an4 territorial waters
under a twelve-mile limit. Of more than one hundred
important international ntraits that are now high seas,
more than fifty would become territorial seao under a
six-mile r . . LI would be reduced to territorial
seas if B twelve-mile limit recoil zed. ^ Thus,
birth ef a twelve-mile territorial seas would signal the
death of ov te hundred lly and economically
impor' • routes.
™
mes can either 50 around
nations, traversing the , or they can become
dependent -.-eement~ ,ias — tolerance and
jts/pitstlen — for their operations.
96. Franklin 1 o->. oit, aupra note 45, at 90; Dean,
.jttement before Saf loans,
,
Jan. 10 1 i960, kZ Dep't 3tate Bull. 251, at 260,





In one of his article* subsequent to the 1958 Geneva
Convention, r. Dean summarized the current situation with
rer^ard to airolanes by saying that 'there is no ri^ht for
aircraft to overfly r nation*s territorial sea ex-
ceot under o treaty, with its consent, or pursuant to the
Chicago Civil Aviatlo vention of 19^ as to the co
ctln- o^rties thereto, ^(citation omitted) l csmuch
as th* venti e \t source for the risht
of ovsrfllscht, it is well to note two facts about it,
Pir all Cozamunist bloc countries are no
t
signatories and are th ound by its terms and ^rant
of nrivile^os. Second, article 3(c) thereof provides
that, If* state *tf*j**ft /""includim: ailitary aircraft_7
of a contr- tote shall fly over the territory of
another lt*t* or land thereon without authorization by
9*61*1 B gr**at*nt or otherwise, and in accordance with
the terms thereof." As to military aircraft, at least,
there seems to be little roon for doubt, rhere is no
ri-ht in t -*ce of special agreement.
98. D**n, The Geneva Conference on the .tow of the Sea l
What ya* Aeoonrolished / j2 \m. J. Int'l b. 607
99. Convention on International Civil Aviation, April fcf




Again, as with submarines, the question may be asked:
Why? Why not allow Innocent passage of military alr-
^nest1 ° It Is conceded, to begin with that overflight
must be subjeot to some controls by the coastal state or
an International body set up for that purpose In order to
provide for air safety, to protect against nuisance, and
to close certain security areas not customarily used for
overfli yit. Aside from these factors, with which aviation
has long had to contend, what purpose is now served by the
denial of the right of innocent passage? Two purposes
come to mind. First, the denial affords a nation the
opportunity to flex its International muscles by asserting
its national sovereignty. This hardly seems to be adequate
Justification for the denial. Secondly, it provides some
measure of secrecy by protecting against the gathering of
100. In view of the shooting down of an unarmed United
ites training plane over Sast Germany in January
1964 when it lost its bearings due to radio failure,
It is recognized that the task of convincing the
Soviet bloc to give up the prohibition against over-
flight in its territorial sea may well be Impossible,





coastal intelligence by aerial reconnaisanoe. when one
stops to thinic about it, however, there is little differ-
ence except for the angle of view between a fishing boat
plying the waters a mile or so off the Florida coast and
an airplane a mile or so above it.
This angle, of course, may be all Important, but is
the need for seourity from the prying1 ' eyes" of an airplane
on the coast of such great importance that a coastal
boundary should be given greater protection than a land
boundary? States bounded by land have no extra distance
for protection alon,: such boundaries.
3. Internal Waters
The third area that is exempted from the burden of
innocent passage rights is inland waters. Under most
circumstances, inland waters are not affected militarily
by an extension of the territorial sea. There are tt?o
Important exceptions, however. One occurs where the
opening to an area of water was too broad for that water
to be classified as a bay under a narrow limit but narrow
enough to become a bay under a broad limit. In such cases
not only does the extension of the territorial limit
create a bay out of the high seas, but it also causes
the outer limit of the territorial sea to be measured




second exception, with .acre serious consequences, arises
where the territorial sea is attended by the use of
straight baselines, roe circumstance in Indonesia has
been discussed previously101 and is an le
of this exception. By its proclamation, 10 Indonesia has
attempted eate an area of internal waters over which
it would have ooarolete sovereignty. extension is
recog-fined f Indonesia will become a country that is pre-
dominantly under ocean water, and the trading nations of
the world will be det>riveu of the free use of historic
and well-traveled ites.
ti general rule that there is no innocent passage in
inland or internal waters has been limited by both consent
and convention. Indonesia is also an example of the con-
sen . .rticle J of A- . ^10 -^ provides that
"(1) Innocent .xtssnge in the inland seas of Indonesia is
open to foreign water transport. (2) Inno as
referred to in clause (1) can be regulated 7ernsumt
Regulation," Such regulations v?ere promulgated as
101. i 36-31 suor •
102. :>tf: 1




Crovernaent Ordinance No, 8 on July 28, 1962. In these
regulations there are provisions in article ^ for the
prohibiting of peaceful passage. Article 7 particularly
restricts innocent passage for military ships. It provides
that:
(1) iJefore undertaking a peaceful passage in the
sea territory or internal waters of Indonesia, the
foreign warships and Government vessels that are
not merchant ships must first notify the Minister/
def-of-Staff of the Wavy, unless the said passage
is along sea lanes which have been or will be deter-
mined by the Kinister/Chief-of-Staff of the Navy.
(2) When crossing through Indonesian waters, for-
eign submarines must sail on the surface of the water.
105
In the Explanatory Memorandum on Act 4, * the Indonesian
government is explicit in pointing out that this grant
of innocent passage in Internal waters is designed to
stimulate commercial shipping and, since it pertains to
inland seas> that "Indonesia may withdraw the facilities
granted." It would seem quite clear that Indonesia feels
it has made these concessions as a matter of grace and
not in recognition of the rights of any other nation.
At the present time, of course, Indonesia's feelin
at to grace are quite correct. It has acted as a matter
10*f. Stat. HU (1962) No. 36.
105. Contained in annex to Circular Ho. H. 2k8 of the




of grace, albeit a grace prompted by economic necessity.
During the seventh session of the International Law
Commission, it was decided to make provision for innocent
passage through waters that would become Internal as a
consequence of using the straight baseline method of
determining territorial seas* Essentially, article 5
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone10? is an adoption of the Commission's decision.
Thus, by convention, there may be a right to innocent
passage in internal waters. 108
4, Surface Passage
Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous ,',one provides, in part, that "ships
of all States • . • shall enjoy the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea," This expresses, in
a few words, the general rule of customary international
law. In practice, however, the matter is not as simply
stated. The portion of the article quoted contains three
106, International Law Comm'n, Report. U.H. Gen, Ass, Off.
Rec. 3th Sess., Supp. No. 9» at 4 (A/3159).
10?. Note 75 supra .
108. Inasmuch as established international law contains
no such right in internal waters, the Convention
does not speak as law until it enters into force







words the Interpretations of which hare caused anything
but a uniform conclusion among legal authorities and
nations. These three words arei innocent, passage, and
ships,
a. What is Innocent?
The article itself attempts to define the word
"innocent.'* It states, in oaragraph **, that "passage is
Innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage
shall take place in conformity with these article and
with other rules of international law."* ^ . Singling,
a United States* delegate, expressed the view, in the
debate on this paragraph, that the sole test of the inno-
cence of a passage was whether or not it was prejudicial
to the security of the coastal state. He defined the word
109. Inasmuch as the only specific reasons for denying
i suoh nassage are the peace, good order, and security
of the coastal state, as innumerated in the article,
the additional words "other rules of international
law" would seem to be merely redundant and not
suggestive of other qualifications. ore was at
the conference, however, an insistance by a number
of delegations that these words were necessary.
In a debatable situation, then, on© may expect to
be faced with an argument, based on "other rules
of international law," in an attempt to broaden
the justification for a denial of passage on the
basis that it lacked innocence*
5^

security as applying to military security or other threats
to the sovereignty of the coastal State and not to economic
110
or ideological security. In making this statement,
Mr, Yingllng was addressing himself to a United Stat
proposal whl ch omitted the words n peace, good order o:
as well as "and with other rules of international law."
In view of these amendments, i r. Singling'• sole test
becomes only one of several tests. In addition, the pas-
sage must not violate the peace and good order of the
state. These are tremendously important additions for
they cultivate wide fields, fertile for the raisin- of
objections to passage. There are, of course, obvious
actions which would be to the prejudice of -oeace, good
order and security. But who is to define these terms
in less obvious cases? In the final analysis It will in
most cases by the Judicial or executive authorities of
110. 1st Comm. Summary ilec. of r':©etln^;s and Annexes, 3
Off. Bee. 32-83, U.N. Doc. Mo. A/CONF.13/39 (1958),
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the coastal state »*** This woftld be particularly true
where the vessel concerned is not government owned since
a privately owned ship does not have the same immunity
from seizure granted to a government owned ship. Whether
owned privately or by the government, however, the whole
tenor of the Convention and the debates accompanying its
formation point to a conclusion that the decision of the
coastal state as to its own peace, good order and seourity
will at least be given ^reat weight if an international
decision is necessary. The coastal state controls the
innocence of the ship in another way, also. In a later
section the controls and regulations that a state may
will be discussed. It will Suffice here merely
to note that should a passing ship fail to comply with
111. See McDougal 66, where it is stated that "the authority
accorded a coastal state in the territorial sea. is
and must be, very comprehensive indeed, extendi
a
even to a substantial measure of discretion in de-
ter tg the innocent character of a particular
passage. • ." These authors also see in art. 14(4-)
of the Convention on t\. :\ritorial Mb and the
mi coasiderable authority £"fOT the
coastal stateJ to qualify passage as non-innocent."
Id. 6?. At the 1958 Geneva Conference, Mr. Singling
voiced the United States position that in the first
Insta-.ice, the determination as to whether a passage
was innocent or no- was vers to the coastal state. 3
Off. Hec. 84, . . >oc. A/CONF.13/39 (1958).
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r«r wfully imposed by the coast te, its
shi ' ser 1
e?
In once found that the transit is innocent, it
t then be determi:. it is passage* Innocent
intantic for Si nt
passage* Here again, ile itself affords some
oh oo . t,
lissage means n& i the territorial sea for
the pur - of t Bin that 3ea without entering
internal waters, or of internal waters, or
of Mid - - the high seas fro \ters.'' ^
While there is no sxpres c that navigation
must bo by direct routes, >able implication of
the wording is that th^ i must take a route which will
accomplish the traversing without und,ue tinu in
doing it. Ls conclusion is strengthened by the next
paragraph in the article which iat,
includes stof -nchorin.. , -wily in so far as fe
112. Convention on the Territorial dea smd the Contiguous
Zone, Anril 12, lvol, art. 17, U. . :-. /comf.
13/L.52 (1958)*




same are Incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered
necessary by force majeure or by distress. " Thus it would
seem that drills, euch as nman-overboc:
,
and military exercises could not be conducted in territorial
waters. ! 'iile they are innocent, because tb -e not
directed ar.ainst the oe cice, rood order, I by of
any state, still they are not naet forbidden




T '-•erpretation of the word
greatest military eonseouence. The main
does it include war»hips? Merchants >s Clearly have
114the ri-'ht of innocent passage.
a great split amor. tth^ritative -Iters la infc<
law as well ,* - 0b« early authority
contended that warships do H ve the of innocent
passage. ^-^ A noted Sngliftl ttierity finds tl
114. At the 1958 Geneva Conference the r - % delegate
expressed, Etta Soviet position, thfet innocent
passage pm w! only to merchant a " ;ot
to wars] . . 3 Off. dec. 32, U.N. Doc. No. a/CONF.
13/39 (1958*.
115. Tor a more complete disc conflict!-,
views of legal writers see 1 3ruel, Interna tion
its 12>**3 (19*7). frnel's conciusior
"a right proper for warships to pass fehr< terrltor-
tal imtara c ad to aid . id. 2




/~T_7he question Is controversial whether they
enjoy the same right of Innocent passage /"as
merchant ships_7. The better view appears to
be that such user should not be denied In time
of peace when the territorial waters are so
plaoed that passage through them is necessary
for International traffic. 11?
That he Is definitely restricting the innocent passage
of warships is borne out by his later comment that,
... a distinction ought to be drawn between
warships and merchant vessels. The reason for
granting this right /f"of passagej? to merchant
vessels is mainly that sea navigation ought to
be free and that trade communications should
not be Interrupted between the various parts
of the world. oreover, the presence of power-
ful warships in territorial waters and only three
miles distant from the shore may prove a serious
danger to small nations. It is, therefore,
reasonable to concede to a State the right to
enact regulations regarding the passage of foreign
warships through its territorial waters, if con-
siderations based on its safety and protection
justify it. 118
117. Columbos 121.
118. Jjd. 238. While it is reasonable to agree with the
conclusion stated, it seems unreasonable to agree
with the implication that the reasons stated justify
a distinction between warships and merchant vessels.
"That sea navigation ought to be free" is a commend-
able goal, but it applies to warships as well as
merchant vessels. "That trade communications should
not be interrupted" is also a commendable goal, but
one which can be retained, under present conditions,
only if our navies have the freedom of movement
necessary to protect shipping. As to the third
reason, where is the danger In having warships off-
shore if they are in innocent passage?
59

Another noted current authority concludes that "under
customary international law . • . coastal states do not
possess an arbitrary competence to deny passage to war-
ships," 11^ This same authority, however, believes that
"there is a considerable body of opinion that . . .
/"warships have_7 ^^ ri,-;ht of passage through the ter-
ritorial sea," 120
A third current authority in international law,
writing before the 1958 Geneva Conference, has stated
that"a right for the men-of-war of foreign States to
pass unhindered through the maritime belt is not generally
recognized.* 1 *• Me continues by saying, however, that,
As a rule, ... in practice no State actually
opposes in time of peace the passage of foreign
men-of-war and other public vessels through its
maritime belt. It may safely be stated, first,
that a usage has grown up by which such passage,
if in every way inoffensive and without danger,
shall not be denied in time of peace; and,
secondly, that it is now a customary rule of
International Law that the right of passage
through such parts of the maritime belt as
form port of the highways for international









It is unfortunate that all nations do not agree
with this general rule. In actual oractice, the policies
of nations have been as diverse as the statements of the
experts. 12 - In 1?10, Mihu -loot expressed what was then
the traditional United States position as followE*
"Warships may not pass xrithout oonsent into this
/""territorial sea_7 zone, because they threaten, ilerchant-
ships may pass and repass, because they do not threaten.'- 12
fly the time of the Hague Codification Conference in 1930,
the United States had altered itr view only slightly. It
then considered that warships could pass as a matter of
courtesy but not as a matter of rl^ht, 12^ Article 12 of
123. or the 1929 position of a number of states see 2
Basis for Discussion, Conference for the Codification
of International Law, League of Nations Pub. No. C.
7h. n. 39. 1929. v.
12^. XI Proceedings, ilorth Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration 2007; 70, 6lst Cong., 3d
3ess. (1910).
125. See the Russian statement of the U,«, nolicy at 2
Off. Eec. 68. The present 9*S a position Is that
warships do have a right of innocent passa
thr territorial seas. See 2 Off. Hec. 67-
78. This position is supported by "strong legal
arguments. cDougal 556. Apparently, however,
the U.S. fears that disagreements among nations
as to the right will, as a practical matter, make







the draft convention prepared, by the Hague Conference is
an expression of this position. In part, it orovides
that "as a general rule, a coastal State will not forbid
the passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea,
and will not require a previous authorization or noti-
fication. The coastal State has the right to regulate
the conditions of such passage." 12"
The International Law Commission arrived at essen-
tially the same conclusion12 ''' as the Hague Conference.
When the Commission ' s drafl was studied by the 1958 Geneva.
Conference, however, dispute arose as to the requirement
of prior authorization or notification. Some delegations
contended that prior authorisation was required. Others
required only that -orior notification be given the coastal
country. Still others held to the conclusion that no
clearance procedure is necessary as a prerequisite to
innocent passage of warships.
126. Draft Convention, Art. 12, League of Mations, Pub.
No. C, 1930, vol. 9, as quoted in Colombos 238.
127, Article 24 of the Commission's proposed draft reads:
"The coastal State may make the passage of warships
through the territorial sea subject to previous
authorization or notification, formally it shall
grant innocent passage subject to the observance





the tine of this conference the United States had
swung over to the latter view and was joined by a sufficient
number of states so t -an the matter of authorization
and notific came on for a vote, they failed to receive
the two-thirds majority require lis cannot be inter-
preted as an affiriaanoe of the "no clearance" nolioy. It
simply means that the Conference could not reach agreement
and, therefore, wentlon is mute. A. look at the
proceed! :>f the commit, L studied the Convention
leads to the conclusion that a majority of the delegations
may not have intended that warships should have a right to
innocent passage* and it has been vigorously ^ed that
the proceedings clearly show that they d^o not have such a
right. 1:
128. Professor Sorensen TfflWTlTHU the situation by say}
"Consequently, the Convention as it now stands con-
tains no soecial provision relating to the innocent
passage of warships, but only the general rules ap-
licable to all . Ph« ctual text of the Con-
vention would therefore it tho conclusion that
warships have the rights in this respect as
.her ships, but the proceedings of the Conference
leave no room for doubt that thlr not the inten-
tion of the majority of delegatio . i«n, Law
of jqo Sea , Int'l Cone. No. 520 at 235 (1958)
•
specifically qualifies Sorensen* s conclusion
that'* the predominant expectation of states
£ at the 1958 Conference^, therefore, appears to be
it warships have a right of access to the terri-
torial seas, subject to notification." McDougal 220.
Thus, even if the right exists it is not unqualified*
129, See comment by Dr. El-Srian of »t in U.N. Gon,
t. Off. Rec. 13th Bess., 6hh Comm. , 1^ (A/C.6/
590) (provisional record) (1958),

I acusslon thu6 far has inoluded conflicting author-
ities and a currently mute convention. While these are
Indicative of a theoretical conclusion, based on an
interpretation of the minutes of the Conference a more
practlcle determination of whether or not a state can rely
on the Innocent passage of warshlos unhampered by clearance
requirements can be found In the actual practice of nations.
As stated above, many coastal states do not afford the
right of innocent passage to warships, j?hat it may only
be a simple majority rather than a two-thirds majority In
little consolation in our concern for unhampered freedom
of innocent oassage. It is not the number who maintain
controls as much as it is their location and power.
In this connection it is significant to note that
with the exception of Poland, all of the communist nations
that signed the Convention reserved the right of the lit-
toral state to determine whether or not warships might
pass through their territorial sea and, if so, how they
might do it. Other states have expressed their intentions
in other ways. An example is Ghana's amendment to the
United States-Canadian "six ?>lus six" proposal at t
I960 eieva Conference. 1 3° y^ would have required
prior notification.
130. . . Ml< . A/CONP.19/L.10 (I960).
6*>
.
d. Are Atomic-Powered Warships Included?
Most of the discussion in the foregoing subsection
had only conventional warships in mind. '-Jith the advent
of atomic-powered warships a new reason for desiring more
abundant high seas and a corresponding decrease in coastal
state-controlled territorial waters has come into existence.
The question of whether an atomic ship is to be
treated any differently in International law than a con-
ventionally powered ship3- 31 has received recent attention
in international conferences and treatises. As a result,
on May 25, 1962, the Brussels Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Nuclear Ships1 ^ was opened for signature.
During the conferences which formulated this Convention,
the United States opposed its amplication to warships.
However, the Convention was made applicable to warships
as well as merchant shios and the United States did not
131. While the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, art. 16, para, 3» requires that,
if innocefcfc passage is to be suspended, it must be
done "without discrimination amongst foreign ships, H
this admonition would seem to apply to equal treat-
ment of nations rather than types of warships.
132. ^printed in 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 268 (1963). For
more complete information on the Convention see
one, The 1962 .Brussels Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Nuclear -Ships





sign it. Joining the United States In a refusal to sl^pa
was the Soviet Uni^ i Vhus, neither of the states which
possesses nuclear-powered ships agreed to be bound.
As indioated by the title of the Convention, it deals
mainly with financial liability* This is typical of most
of the discussion in this area. Very little has been said,
directly, with regard to the right of nuclear-r>o>rered ships
to innocent passage and le??ally acceptable excuses f
denying such oassage. Perhaps an indication of the status
which a nuclear warship amy be expected to have In terri-
torial waters may be gained from the fact that the United
States has found it necessary, before sailing the nuclear
merchant ship Savannah into foreign waters, ft* lude
Specific agreements with the coastal states.
Because of the breadth of its terms, the United States •
agraesient with the Federal Republic of Germany* -^ i? of
particular note. In addition to indemnlfie sf loss
ease of nuclear accident, this agreement maJces entry
Into the coostal -waters of Germany subject to prior German
approval m . - slftifcftg access to operational
reoorc-. ~.ven when approved, the ship must f~ special
133. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on
the Use of Territorial waters and Ports sy the ;... ,
Savannah , Mov. 29, 1?62, 13 u. . . • o.I.A. 256?,
T.I.4.S. Mo. 5223. f
1
1 .••"- li
instruction* as to router, -dictate, tug Assistance, and
other similar matters.
From these indications it is apparent that not only
will nuclear ships be required to co to more stringent
rules than conventionally-lowered ships but that the
coastal states may have virtually unlimited aower to effec-
tively deny passage o >unds of security and s; . it
is doubtful that the H 9f inspection could be made to
apply to v w because of their traditional immunity.
However, since a number of nations require prior notification
or authorisation even from conventional warships, it is
not hard to imagine that serious attempts will be made to
imooee this requirement on nucl©ar~powered warships,
e. Closure of tho Territorial Sea
In addition to the highly questionable status of
the ri :ht of warships to innocent passage, 1 ^ * there are
at least three other important reasons why innocent massage
throu,-h territorial seas Is a ooor substitute for free use
of hi ; ! i seas. 1-^ These r re the irlffet of the
coastal state to close Its seas, the right of the coastal
13^. It* 1 Oaoenh'
135. In 1 i a state has within
its territorial sea, fio r*S examples of
6?
mi
atate to impose regu.\ |fl on the use 01 yeas, and
the effect of wartime conditions on passage*
19 littoral state has the Uce such action
as Is neosseary within its territorial seas to prote
Itself against any acts proj 1.; M its security.
This includes to restrict temporarily , cr to
aampletely suspe -ary period, innocent
135. ( o '
nine reasons why & territorial sea is a r>oor Btt3»-
ree J ;eas. They are*
**1* uslve rights of exploitation and control
over aniiaal an resources of the marginal
belt j
"2, once to exclude passage through the
elt by qualifying; the
at or, under Ltians, jy sus-
pending any passage at all (the coast has
wholly di: authority to exclude any passage
by aircraft)
$
. Authority to subject navigation in the belt to
the r >f the coastal rtafcej
*k. '.- Indeterminate competence oyer events and per-
sons ab'. /essels;
M 5» An e : terminate jtenoe over the
vassal Itself for purpose of Ju< claims
agai
*o # k competence commensurate with the ition
to maintain safety of n&v 3 Uelti
•y to st ag
resort >ly regulat)
conce security, customs and health;
"9. to control belligerent use of neutr r
w& it be a A even em-
imes of violence.





passage In definite areas . 3& The 1930 Hague Conference
on Codification produced the first general indication
that there was a growing concensus among states to the
effect that a state could suspend the passage of warships
through its territorial seas. ^7 Article 16 of the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
gives further expression to this right and added to it
certain limitations to ensure fairness. 3°
The article goes on to codify an important exception
to the general right of closure Paragraph h states that:
136, See Colombos 120-1; Brittin A Natson, International
Law for Seagoing Officers 65-8 (2d ed. I960),
MoDougal 181, where it is claimed that "a state may
assert authority to deny passage by virtue of its
general competence to prescribe for events within
the territorial sea," or on the basis that the
passage "has prejudicial impact on local security
and other interests" or on the grounds that it is
"non-innocent.' J.'iose three -.rounds are termed.
unctional equlvalentr
137. :cDougal 202,
13C Art. 16 provides, inter alia , that "Subject to the
provisions of paragraph ty, the coastal State may,
id.thout discrimination amongst foreign ships, sus-
pend temporarily in specified areas of its terri-
^ial sea tha innocent paa
s
age of foreign ships if
such suspension is essential for the protection of
its security, Such suspension shall take effect






lere shall be no suspension of the Innocent
paiMfe of foroi 71 llU.pl t'irou ,:i r; traits Mhitk
are used for international navigation between
one part of the high seas and another part of
the high seas or the territorial sea of for-
elrn state.
In this area, too, there have been disputes over the
status of warship . The better opinion, supported by
ieion of the Intarnation Court of Justice in the
Corfu Channel Cage , - 7 is that innocent passage cannot
be denied to foreifji warships if the area is actually a
strait and is customarily used in international traffic. 1
This case arose out of a series of transits by warships
of Great Britain through Corfu Channel, the territorial
waters of Albania. On the first entry of British ships,
Albania had fired at them from the shore. On October 22,
19*1-6, Great Britain sent a second group of ships through
the channel with the announced intention of firing back
if fired upon. Albania did not open fire but the fleet
ran into a field of anchored automatic mines in the Corfu
Strait, heavily damaging ^umareg and causing some
139. The Corfu Channel Case, CV)ly^J I.C.J. X®p.
1*K>. See Colombos 23?; 1 Oppenheim 511.
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daaaglng of IKS Volaae . Great Britain then sent mine-
sweepers through the Channel in order to gather evidence.
In express ins its view, the International Court of Justice
deolared that:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally
recognized and in accordance with international
Custom that States in time of peace have a right
to send their warships through straits used for
international navigation between two parts of the
high seas without the previous authorization of a
coastal State, provided that the passage is inno-
cent . Unless otherwise prescribed in an inter-
national convention, there ie no right for a
coastal State to prohibit such passage through
Straits in time of peace. *-^
Based on this statement of the law, the court concluded
that the second passage was innocent even though the
purpose of the passage was to test the peaceableness of
the coastal country but the third passage, to gain evi-
dence, was not innocent.
The court was also of help in settling the question
as to what is a strait* According to the court, the
criteria for determining whether a strait is international
is in "its geographical situation as connecting two Darts
of the high seas and the fact that it is being used for
international navigation. n1^2




f. The ill ght to Hegulate
Although warships have a better right of innocent
passage In straits than they do in ordinary territorial
sea f even here that right is not unqualified. The war-
ship must still obey the regulations of the coastal state
if it is to retain its Innocent status. 1^ Specifically,
the coastal state may limit the number of warshius which
it will allow to use the strait at any one time and the
length of their stay, 1^ It nay also prescribe definite
routes to as followed during their oassage. 1^
ese two regulations have their particular applica-
bility In straits, but they have their counterparts , and
many more besides, in the multitude that littoral states
ay prescribe for their territorial seas in general. They
aay make regulations concerning the rules of the road,
use of radar, obligatory pilotage, the exclusion of
1^-3. ;al 259 » where it is stated that "there can
be n i.'t that 00 llance
with some coastal lfiws a ^recondition to innocent
1^4. lee Colombo® 18 1.
1^5, -3ruel, International Straits 2^5 (19*7).
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m
foreign oilots, the protection of eacons, light-
ships, submerged cables and pipelines, and the. prohibition
of maneuvers or gunnery practice within i fixed ce
from shore. ^-^ r,hese are but a few.
It is generally recognized that a littoral state may
set rules requi ahips passing through its territorial
seas to render certain salutes and to show the flag of
the hip** nationality. Failure to do ulted
in serious cons ^es. In 1864, the British schoon
The .Mermaid failed, to exhibit her flag while she was in
Spanish territorial waters. She was sunk by Spanish
cannon-shot.*1- t7 In February, 1958, the Indonesian navy
arrested and held the British ship Moon freezes for
failure to fly the 7-ritish colors while In Indonesian
waters. 1 Indonesia has also furnished at least two
other examples of regulations and their effects. In
Ike. See ibos 120-1; Franklin, The law of the Seas
• ae decent Developments, 5' ' Coll lue
ries 89 at 131-47 (1961).
147. :ee Colomboe 150.




August, 1?60, It forbad Dutch vessels from picking uo or
disch- T.ssen or oargo In Indonesian waters. -^9
;he Dutch shi^s co . through the
newly created ,; internal waters'' of Indonesia, they could
conduct no commercial ration . years later
Indori rrel was with . ysla. On ;cr 26,
e Indian shir- Uohamedl with 2?6 persons aboard,
st 1 ' a reef near an island bet*/- Inapore and
Xndcoa.es] „- vitish ttavy salvage ship out
of re vent to its aid but was ordered out of the
area by three Indonesian gunboafes • *-
These last two Indon- actions raise the question:
What determines the validity r International law of a
alation of a coastal state? Sitally > this question
is answered by balanc' ivention
on th ritorlal :.'ea and the Contiguous Zone against two
other . si the one hand, "The as ,e must not hamper
l^linnoo fassage thr bhe territorial sea, '"^ On the
other hand, "The oo ,q may take the necessary steps
1^9. •!« Eta*** June 20, i960, a, $6, col, ?,
150, vening 3tar, Dec, 2?, 1963, p. A-ll.
151. 15> pi . !•

• territorli'l sea t vent postage which
I
>s exerci ht of liinocen
passage r ws an
^se articles an or rules of interna-
I > transport and
>f the Conference is clear anou/£h from
these ~uot regraphs* have the right
take res; rovided those r .ions are necessary





issues a re$ pro-
MtttgMS Sbe in
152. Art. iai).
\$k. tie hu 1 the
the conference, BeD©u~al, with "first-hand"
i intention of the
rite to preclude
e for a violation of a regulation
nrtalning fee the *pea4 §*4 order or security-* of
the coastal state on the ground that suoh a violation
made the passage not innocent. Ships could not be




its territorial seas. Obviously, such a reflation would
be of gigantic military significance* Is it a lawful
regulation?*^5
In 1923, in pursuance of a Prohibition oollcy, the
United States Treasury issue, otice whioh prohibited
the introduction of all liquor into the territorial waters
of th oates. In writing about this situation,
one authority has stated that *'it is believed that the
proposition is unquestionable that under international
law every nation may prohibit the introduction into its
territory of any commodity which it sees fit to exclude," ^
While agreeing with the statement as a basic tenet, a
number of nations contested the ITnited States? prohibition
on the ground that by international oomlty, they had a
it to shin their products through the territorial waters
of othe ions without . /en these nations,
however, recognized that comity did not extend, thir it
to the shipment of items that *-ould dist Lie order,
*"
The first question, then, to be answered is whether, under
155. iled analysis of this question, see
onslin, ojea oit. supra note 1 • , - i-4.
156. Jesswo, ? jaw of Territorial vJaters and 'aritime
Jurisdiction 219 (192?). .-.ee 1 Oppenhelm 323 to the
same effect with regard to trade restrictions,




the conditions existing at the time, the introduction
aboard ship of nuclear weapons into the territorial waters
would disturb nubile order or endanger national security.
In the Committee debate on the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Yugoslavia
introduced a prooosal which would have allowed the
coastal state to deny innocent passage "to any ship
carrying any kind of nuclear weapon" * This proposal
was rejected with only seven votes in favor of it.**9
The conclusion may be drawn from this rejection that
there is no blanket prohibition in international opinion
against the carrying of nuclear weaoons in territorial
seas. This does not answer the question, however. Just
because a regulation against every carrying of nuclear
weapons would, in international ooinion, constitute an
undue hampering of innocent passage does not mean that
every reflation against carrying nuclear weapons would
obtain the same result. The test of reasonableness must
be applied. If the regulation pertained to only one
situation or one area where a particular, recognizable,
serious danger to the security of the state existed from
158. . , 3. No. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.21 (1958).
159. 3 Off. 3ec, 131, U.flu Doe. No. A/CONF.13/39 (1958).
n
&fi$ b*h t±£ »arf sic ^f**.!-. • -
I^RCUOTO -5
IMiiiH «m r r#r\ \-„- .. . . .
«e*t Jtetftiz* »*** *<*»
the passage of nuclear weapons, It mi&ht indeed be reason-
able for the rohiblt it. Usin/5 the test of
reasonableness, then, a state may Issue regulations which
ships in innocent passage mist obey.
In discussing the enforcement of regulation* | a dis-
tinction must be made between warships and merchant
ships. *°° There has long been a standing rule of inter-
national law under which warships are immune from the
Jurisdiction of a foreign coastal state whenever their
presence in the port of that state has h®@n either ex-




3adden , 1k^ an 1812 United States Supreme Court case,
Chief Justice Marshall biassed a trail that has been
referred to by courts ever since. LOC In 1810, during: the
160. In the past the distinction has been between govern-
ment-owied shies and privately owned ships. With :
communist elala that all of their ehipE .are ^ovem-
ment-owned and the distaste on the part of other
countries for
I
nunity to all communist
ships regardless of their purpose, a new distinction
had to be drawn. Art. 21 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zorm expresses
this new distinction by providing that -vovernaent
ships operated for commercial purposes will be
treated the same as merchant ships.
161. 7 Granoh. 116.
162. although Chief Justice Marshall apparently over-
look: contrary decision by the U.S. attorney
General, I . ,tt*y Saw. 37 (1799), and there
have been attempts to discredit this case, it is







Napoleonic wars, French authorities had selzec
flohooner jgffffftHMPMWI which, until seizure, had been the
property of United dtates citizens. The schooner was
converted Into a French warship, La Jalaou . and, as such,
entered the oort of Philadelohia, T!er former owners
sout -> gain passesalwt af hsr. < ldin for France,
Chief JtapH49 M»—w^" ued« *It seems to the Court
to be ft principle of public law that national shins
war, enter" ft* nort of ft friendly Power ooen for their
receotion, midered exempted oy fche consent
of Hi MP from its jurisdiction*"
MM language, the English Court
of Admiralty concurred with the Exohan^e opinion. The
case was that of The Constitution ,^3 a United States
fri&ate which became stranded off the isnglish ooast and
waft towed to ft* IftgU ->rt. The amount tendered to
the t lers for salvage was not adequate in their
view and they sought to restrain the fri froa leavir
oort until their demands were satisfied. The Court of
Atoiralt led that the tug owners had such a right
again warship *f e foreign sovereign.
I63. -titutlon, £ 13?9_7 *& Z*™ Rep., Prob.,




While both of these cases dealt with ships In port,
the result Is essentially the same for the territorial
sea. Warships enter the territorial waters of
state under a consent imnlled in International oustc
They must be treated as though they are "floating portions
of the flap; state* Thus, if an offense occurs and a
warship is the offender, only two courses are or>en to the
aggrieve te under internnti *• First, it may,
if the violation contirt "he ship has been noti-
fied of it, reonire the shir) to leave the territorial
tea. ^ Second, the offended State may protest to the
government of the State to which the offending ship
belon
The olirht of merchant ships is another matter,
however, and, because they transport military supplies
as well as suooort the civilian community from which
military supplies and supnort are derived, their plight
16**. 1 Oooenheim &6l, 852-55.
165. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the




is of decided military importance. 1 "** Articles 18,
and 20 of the Convention on the Territc ;ea and the
uou8 Zon* express a summary of the interna t:
law in this area. 1 express language and by per-
missive rather than mandatory phrases, these articles
allow many instances in which the free movement of mer-
chant shios oan be impeded in territorial waters.
particular importance to a discussion of enforcement
166. r. Jean, in his usual peroeptiveness, has com-
mented that of commercial shipping
on, or commercial aircraft over, water would also
be 8 down and subjected
to interminable delays. Indeed, it would seem to
rt of the Ruse
extensions of the territorial sea so to hamper
the commerce of the fr- part of its
sand-in-th- - >ex technique . . . . ie ri ;;ht
and ablll it merchant ships carry! r, and
passengers to schedule the most economical passage
etween oorts, to enter and leave harbors
freely, and to move on the surface of the water
without i a Jeopard! zed.
*
Dean, fae oe on the law of the Sea;
:. Int 1 ! L. oO?, at
; 5" ) •
167. For a gft#4 analysis of this area of law see Lee,
orel i3i &
rltorlal .:--ea: -\n Analysis of th >n-
'
'




of regulations arc the provisions of article 20. In part
It provides that where there are atlons or liabil-
ities Mtuaed or Incurred by the i itself In the
course or for the purpose of Its voyage through the
waters of the coastal State, that state say "arrer
the ship for the our^ose of . . . civil oroceedlngs.
Further, the state lias the right, "In accordance with
l%i 1?.t ts, to levy execution against or to arrest, for
the r e of any civil proceedings, a forei/pi ship
lying In the territorial sea, or passing through the
territor* m* after leaving int« wu" In
other words, if a foreign merchant ship vlo ' a
e coastal state while in the territorial
or ] 1 waters of that state, it arrested for
civil proceed"- . L« threat, 11 as the threat
of a.tv ' ^mce or nuisance fro of
©oastal i g cot) 11 cause the merchant lines to
Change to 1 rottt«v, i/hether they do this or lose
money due to delays, shipping costs are increased.
j of the yea, Int'l
520, 234 ( ) where the conclusion is
that, although the coastal state is authorized
to enforce its regulations, it is not allowed to
_r Ly on the ground of their
vl
.it mm
:>8e cog Us ultimately arc the oountries de-
pendent ocean commerce for their exist . 81n<
In gener- , iese f -vitrios of the -
the members o. . ocea > ederation, the Communists
countries have much to aadeninp; territorial
g, '-sage In wartime
The foregoing disc n of innocent nassage has
dealt primarily with a peacetime situation. A much
different pietaure il presentee: under a wartime situation*
There is, of oourse, no right of innocenl 9 between
antagonists nor are they concerned with the legality of
their acts in each other* s territorial seas ae as
they 00 not violate the laws of war. The concept of
innocent pass ily in neutral waters and
severely limited by the requirement that neutral waters
not be used fee advan; I war effort of the belligerent*,
A peacetime extension of territorial seas wl ;ht
of innocent passage would, to a large extent, 1 a
wartime extensio liout sue 1, A l eh
now is high seas would* if i is the territorial
sea of a neutral nation in \ m due to an extension
of the breadth of the territorial seas, be closed to any

aotlvity wiii cii would promote the wartime of a
ligero lt« lous t lie extent a.id seriousness
of tills result Is entirely denemdent upon which countries
are neutrals and will eh « st
assume the worst, however, f /on
the unlikely chanoe that routes
will be under it ltrol or ti-
the worst in this respect, and remembering that over
half of the 100 most it straits xae ter-
ritorial seas ifch of si:- Id
be in th'. ; under a twe • lie limit, a major
disadvantage to the free worl the extension of the
breadth of territorial seas is evident.
C . is of Neutral Territory
Ordi massage refers to passage that
Is • security and peace of
state. Aim • neut.ru I is involved in wartime, that
169. to a statement made before the Senate Porei
latio
that under the 12-mile territorial sea rule,
1 sovereignty of states
which oossibly would e the right to termina'
or interfere with the t t of our warships or
aircraft, . . , the denial of passaf
these . • . straits would ores. / the Luiited
esj
. . . tely urn >te impairment
of £~its_7. , . defensive mobility and capacity, n
42 i)r tate iull, 251. at 260,
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passage must be lnnoo«nt as to a belligerent state as
well. Vhen It Is not, there has been a violat sf
neutral territory.
ce , during peacetime the passage of a
ship threw territori- I of tttfl )*)t
concern any other state. ree a duty to obey
the VtfU le coastal state but not those of any
other state. BS ftlM 38 a duty to
the ship not to unduely hinder Its passage or fall to
warn It of dangers but does not owe any duty to a third
state. In wartime, however, belligerents are interested
In the circumstance of an enemy -cause it has a
direct effect an its military str . Therefore, a
neutral covmtry owes a duty to third states vho are
belligerents not to allovr their ene-mie: Pttlly
use its raters. In a sense the passing sh-< OWM
a duty to the third state since it in
accordance with international law which glv ~ent
State a basis to require that its enemy not vl--
neutral territory.
At the Geneva Uonferences, one of the dominant
thetaes expressed by the United States against the ex-
tension of the territorial seas was that extension would
encourage an Increase in violation of neutral territory.
' '
.
The broader the neutral territorial sea is, the more
attractive It oecomea to a belligerent shlt>. One reason*
of course, 1c that navigation Is easier If It is within
sight of charted navigational objects, lighthouses, et
cetera, and ship's Captains are generally disposed to
navigate where it Is easiest. The broader the territori
sea, whether neutral or not, the greater the temptation
to go within it in order to use on-shore navigation aids.
For a case In point, consider the selsure of the Plying
Clipper , a Swedish ship by the Russians in the Baltic Sea
on August 29 » 1956. *?° Because of a storm the Flying:
Clipper had drifted off course and had entered the
twelve-mile *one olai y lussia in order to use land-
marks to check its position.
Of greater concern, however, is the intentionally
belligerent use of neutral waters. Submarines, for
instance, would be particularly lured Into the excellent
haven furnished by a broad territorial sea. ftavl/satlon
hazards within a three-mile limit, as well as the good
chance of detection within that range makes the use of
neutral waters an undesirable evasive manuever. between





three and twelve miles, however, the hazards to submerged
navigation are decreased, In most areas and, because
present day detection of underwater objeots at a distance
beyond three miles is not adequate, this area furnish
a tenr althanaJi illegal, haven, ?* The submarine
would ba out of range of ordinary detection from the
shore and, unless a pursuing surface fleet openly vio-
lates the neutrality of the coastal country by making an
attack within its territorial sea, from a surface anti-
submarine force, m enemy submarine might avoi
detection and capture when it is pursued, but it can do
even more than that, Nestled securely in the safety of
neutral praters, the submarine might, without interference,
launch an attack against the coastal state or against an
enemy tares t within range of the noutral state's terri-
torial seas* Because of their numerical superiority in
171. It v- rt, 14 of the Conventio the Territor-
L Sea requires ^submarines to navi^te on the sur-
-md to Shew their flag, It xiould be optimistic





submarines, 1?2 this situation would be of particular
advantage to the Soviet Union. Phis may well be another
reason for the Russian lnslstanoe on broad territorial
seas and le certainly a cogent reason why the Free world
would want to keen as much open seas as possible.
In view of Iraailnent attack from a submarine lurk:
In neutral waters, the Captain of a warship could hardly
be blamed If he elected to take direct defensive action
rather than to submit a protest through diplomatic
channels. " Assuming he violates neutral territorial
waters and attacks the malevolent submarine* may he
1?2. Since the end of i/orld War II, a considerable
tuil&ing program has bean, maintained by the
avian Havy, and it is estimated t' iissla
m has over 500 submarines, J
Ships 288 (1959-68). The submarine has the
dominant role i aian naval strategy.
Garthoff , silica, note 89
•
173, For an interesting case where a Captain elected to
attack an enemy ship in neutral waters, see the
exchange notes of the Dresden Incident as reported
in 7 Haefcworth, Digest 370-71.
-.'
oanture r take her crew captive? r'ince a submerged
submarine is not in innocent passage, the answer is pro-
bably yes, 3ut as to a surface ship, unless its bel-
u*poee oan be proven, the answer is no. As
an exception to the general rule that enemy oror^rty can
be captured wherever It -3ns to be, enemy oronerty
ldiats< It tarri' L waters of a neutral state is
not the subject of »•« ven UM capture is
unintentionally accomplished in neutral waters, the







' an iglish cr.ae in l§6}j Mm UWM
was w' v or not ft ship had been seized on the high
seas or in the protc of land." sir William
ott set ferth tv- i follows i
The sanctity of ft claim of territory is
undoubtedly very high .... tfhftn the fact
ill shed, it o very afcher con-
sideration. The capture is done araay; the
stored, not
that It may actually belong to the enem ,
17**. See Oolombos 5^-.
175. 5 C. . 15 (1803), 165 £n&. en. 681 (dictum).
39

Article 1 of tfa#ue Convention Kill176 espoused the
Drinoiple by requiring belli erents to "reelect the
soverel<*n rights of neutral Powers and to abstain, in
neutral territory or neutral waters, from any aot whioh
would, if knowingly oermitted bry any Power, constitute
a violation of neutrality.
The oase of the Altmark > whioh arose in February,
19^0, during the Second World War, illustrates, however,
that this immunity of an enemy from attack in neutral
waters certains only where the enemy property is nressnt
in "innocent passage.*' This incident also points out
another example of the misuse of territorial waters that
would be Increased with a broader limit to the military
detriment of a nation trying to respect neutral rights
T*16 Altaark 1^-77 & German naval auxiliary, was used to
transport 3rltish merchant seamen prisoners who had been
captured by the German cruiser Admiral Graf Spec. Having
176, Convention XIII of October 18, 1907t concerning
the id Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War t Second Hague Peace Conference, Feb. 1, 1910,
36 . 2*U5, • • ' 5#
177. See ? Haekworth, Digest, 568-69 (19^3) for another
'.tenant of the facts.
90

taken in the South Atlantic, it was necessary to
transport them baok to Germany through tho Allied naval
blockade which existed at that time. In order to avoid
capture or attack in the English Channel, the
went north through Icelandic waters and then start-
south using the neutral Norwegian territorial waters as
a protected corridor, ritlsh forces, however, learned
of the presence of the Altaark and, wh« Tregian author-
ities refused to allow a British inspection of the shi
the British forces boarded the Altma id released the
prisoners.
While the A ltM|{| incident illustrates an illegal
belligerent use of neutral waters, it also chovs that
neutrality is a two-way street. Both the nm country
and the ships using its waters have their respective
duties under international law. Hague ntion XIII
codifies these "do's and dont's" of neutral water .
With the Convention as a background, arguments have
raged between nations and authorities as to whether
Norway was delinquent in its duties as a neutral by
allowing the Altmark to use its waters and whether or
not the British forces had the rlcht to make a sear
91
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btftMei t'i^tMMH |AMrceK ';•/,'"'... •zo.ol'-rrxs :'-- ' p -rf*yyy e
Ml
as they did. 1
The duty of iomay is important in t
because It indicates the adverse >ailltary effect vrVii
a neutral state's decision may have. If the neutr-
state decides that the action of an enemy b rent
shin is? le^al and will taice no action against it, it
places the burden upon the c belli it of r
aecer>tl-'i~ that decision or wmlftj the danger of tl
neutrality. Looking at the question froa t; r side,
if the neutral state decides that a :e of
1 shine is not innocent, it may d* se
interfer with the passage of that . t, look!"
at the p on from either side, a
territorial seas will produea a br
-rhlch a neutral state may adversely affect our war-
173. or a general discussion of viorv
dutl "acChesn
\ol ''/ -:':X- M k^ .->.-. '.c-riv 'i ^ —
;
jl-- u:.oc-:
"c 337-^0 (195?) • lions hold
rimy to have been under a duty to orevent pace





International Lav b 14-1 ^ (19*11).
179. onvention XIII, art. Zk, note 176 supra .
.
Whether or not the ritlnh forces were act!
lawfully in the Altaark situation ^.e^on&n unon an inter-
pretation of the circumstances. I general,
although not unani ' as? ities
for the nooition
a belli nTGYiz is not forbidden to resort to
act* of hostility in 1 ."Jurisdiction
against enemy troops, ft
na use of 1 territor
waters or air
not or b effestively rce its ri
against offendi rent force .
reach of neutrality must, however, be sufficiently-
serious to Justify such an extreme measure. It must be
required for self- .rvation. ''
International Court of Justice, the
territorial water to obtain evidence to
prosecute a breach of a coastal s duty to shi ooing
180. aimra note
A,!
.fffarfc , 9 Transact. Grot, rioo'y
6? (l^ll) where it In hel
oo was justification for
th< -bish Hi.
181. •.;. :':. >€ ivy, Law ot
).
ra note 1?8 at
' /Yxtft T
In those waters Is not a serious enough oauSv °y
3helP- aerioiie It uust be in an unanswered
ion la intemation suit, In any case,
is tha!: d territorial sea gives an enemy oa
*n *'' lestinely and gives the United
less operatl to ferret out sue
tl
wmfcia m win
co&itant of a oroad territorial sea is a *f
M ijrener i cation than not beln I* to
in% ate v: »f I < state*© sovereignty,
J* Id len whether in oeaee or war or
war.
In *&•• 3 possibility of nucloar
at fleets must be dispersed over a wide area,
^s t; elve- territorial sea
lt9vr rea for dispersal
of fl the answer to the probl-.u Part
of ireas. ,:.e old
**^ on of I s to ,mard from
II See Corfu Channel case, p. 70 , supra , although
this was not a neutrality case it is ana'! to
the exte the same olrcumstanoe in neut~
waters would not inptify self-help either.
9$
.-
submarine attack has had to give way to a dispersed
formation more suitable to defense against nuclear
attack. For a present-day task group to travel about
the oceans, they should be dispersed over an area roughly
the size of New York State. 18^ It is obviously difficult
to move a group of this size through congested areas such
as straits and island-spotted seas without lessening its
defenses. Any extension of territorial seas makes it
that much more difficult. Because of the uncertainty
of the right of innocent passage for warships in peace-
time and the limit of three warships that can be in neutral
territorial seas at any one time during wartime, 18 * it
Is conceivable that the number of passages open to Naval
forces could be extremely limited with a broad territorial
sea. This could force a large amount of military traffic
through one area, increasing the risk of attack in that
area.
An even more important part of the problem is
whether the forces can be dispersed in an area where
184. See statement of Adm. Burke quoted in Slier,
Implications of Soviet Sea Power , published in
The Soviet Navy 299 1 at 313 (Saunders ed. 1958).
185. Hague Convention XIII, art. 15, supra note 176.
95
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they can be effective. For an example, Assume that
fighting broke out In Singapore. If the 'lavy were to
respect the claimed Indonesian interne territorial
waters, it would be impossible to orse a task grosp
In the imjttdi&te area. is is not an Isolated instance.
In the Aegean, the eastern Mediterranean, the other seas
around Indonesia, and the seas adjacent to the Phil ies
and Japan an extension of each island's territorial sea
would restrict the operational ability of the fleet.
*"
Such an extension T*euld have made the landing of American
troops in Lebanon of questionable legality, In the area
between Formosa and china, the reoogniti lve«»
mile territorial sea would mean that the United States
ships oroteotinr Quemoy and *?&tsu would violate ter-
ritorial waters. lS7
loyment
During the past few years the ?Javy has been par-
ticularly effective because of its; ility of being
deployed quickly for limited war and cold war purposes
186. oan, gflfmftpn of the ^eas , 3? Foreign Affairs
, at 90 (1953).










to orospeotlve trouble snots, without vlols\tir
sovereignties. The effectiveness o capability of
bringing pressure to bear without firing a shot and of
staying as long as necessary le attested to by the
Inverse tribute paid to It by Soviet .rushehev.
In a letter received September 8, 1958, by dent
enhower, ^r. Crushchev stated*
In connection with the practice of trans-
porting w&r fleets m t units from one end
of the globe to another, for example,
regions of the Msar an lie Sast, the Far
Bast, Latin America etc. in order to bri
assure to bear here on some, there on other
states and to atteamt to die .11
on them, In general the question arises —
isn't it time to finish with such actions
which, it ^oes without saying, can in no
way ever be rec normal methods in
international relations, ere arises the
legitimate question •— ought this not be dis-
cussed in the OH and a decision be adopted
forbidding powers from employing such movement
of its naval and air forces for purposes of
\ackmall and intimidation and to the effect
at these forces wo s held within the
Its of their natl /rentier .
In order to he of continued effective-
ness on these "diplomatic deployments" it is essential
that the same proximity of Free world xai^it be ooaaunist-
insplred trouble spot be maintained. In other words,




since its main reason for effectiveness! is the osycholog-
ioal effect of its presence, it must be capable of being
seen. A fleet only three miles away can be easily seen.
If it must be dispersed six miles out its effectiveness
is diminished. If twelve miles, it is out of sight and
mind. Its presence is a mere rumor which dare not
materialize without treading on sovereign seas.
F# Calm tfater Operations
A final result to be discussed is the deprivation
of the use of much calm water lying in land-protected
areas within twelve miles of the shore. Mot only is
the use of sueh water of benefit during rough breather
but it is also idealy suited for a number of military
exercises, ciefueling at sea, transfer of supplies and
personnel, the launching and recovery of aircraft, gun-
nery exercises, and many others can be accomplished with
less risk of loss and damage if they son be performed
in the calm of sheltered waters.
98









In the foregoing nages an atteraot has been made
set forth some of the militarily important lftgal effects
that would result from ex + >ns of territorial seas
under oresent conditions and laws, i compilation
not sxhaustiv . b areas have been
•elected and di ;d in an effort to tynify the legal
resuit r. that can '
.
say that the snirv" of the Free won >ends
n the mainfce:; IS throe-mile limit is, of
course, an ea Lon« tet to say that t * of a
territori l Unit in favor of a broad limit
is a aaj.or step in the direction of the defeat of the
ee world le fearfully realistic. The Free W#r3
depen m it; id the air ' -r©
them tPV It . \tlon th or
disi"a m sea lanes ha® wo 'a-?, 1 lecldi
battl< b the ocee Ity ttf
we 11 \ .
ie sxt :sion of territorial seas serve
this pur -losing large areas of the high seas
to overfli ^sage. \b of
the hlsh seas large areas of territorial waters with the
99
m
hlndomneas, restrictions, and increased shionin- cost*
that can result t . Baking international dtwi
out of the hi h "oae and 1 is sane hlnderancea.
sme f Leay r *inee. By
^reasinp; the tor.1 ^rrit seas
In more re s navigational inforaa*
tio .
belligerent paaaa^ ??aterr . • the
arltlme natir reas staters.
And b - of the
fleot "
-i whether aerial.
^a*m the i that an
t is lo if the
red, lestion reinaini
1st rhat to t It? One alternative |1 to seek
to | by international agreements , the
forded ay N* li ' -tqII
Include doctrine of
to incur© its appllc urface warshl 1 to
bro. Lon to include melt
and f 3 over straits and similar waterways. ie
preservi . sea in the Mided
areas would prove beneficial, Che imposition of
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limitations on the use of the straight line method of
determlni Lies would be heluful although attempts
to thle end at I ?ieva Conferences were largely to
avail.
As an alternative approach, it Is suggested that
the c >t of a terri ja has outlived Its nee* .
To say that It I abandoned altogether and that
all external waters a revert to the high seas woi;
seem to be or reme suggestion. Certainly a great
amount of oduca" *ould be required for such pro-
I. It is advanced, however, with
i belief that it affords a solution for the future.
Is there any long a reasonably valid nts®d for the exercise
of total i In a aratively narrow strS
of water alon coasts of a nation? Can a need be
named which c S easily be taken care of by the
allowance for a special, limited exercise of sovereignty
In the area?i89 coastal states
189. Al 1th a total dine ->f ter-
ritorial seas in mind an has
been me? cever th uicular interests
ifitinjpr claims
- measures for securing such
Ly re
fchor*




already have the right to reasonably r>rotect themselves,
the latural resource© of the telf,
and the ri-ht to enforce custoras, fiscal, iiami ion and
sanitation laws and regulatio yond its territorial
tea* Shoir is, other soecl
extensions of sovereignty be required, such as an I
elusive fi zone, they can be addc ,.
But by doing away t of the territorj oa
we would do away with t strio'
lnolor;y, and nd cou&ft start
afresh in , ss have
no extra area oi idarii
Why should the nac
seas to furnish
* the attempts to territo seas of
the world a vital certainly
are. The Russl oar is a . !ks Is) laany
areas and in mx, ' -. One of
these Is the extension of Itori -r. aehev
has promised It ot be
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